(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–348. Argued January 17, 2017—Decided May 15, 2017 

Petitioner Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in respondent Johnson’s 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, asserting that Johnson owed Midland 
credit-card debt and noting that the last time any charge appeared 
on Johnson’s account was more than 10 years ago. The 
relevant statute of limitations under Alabama law is six years. Johnson 
objected to the claim, and the Bankruptcy Court disallowed it.
Johnson then sued Midland, claiming that its filing a proof of claimon an obviously time-barred debt was “false,” “deceptive,” “misleading,” 
“unconscionable,” and “unfair” within the meaning of the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U. S. C. §§1692e, 1692f. The District 
Court held that the Act did not apply and dismissed the suit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 

Held: The filing of a proof of claim that is obviously time barred is not afalse, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable debt collectionpractice within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 
Pp. 2–10.

(a) Midland’s proof of claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.” 
The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “claim” as a “right topayment,” 11 U. S. C. §101(5)(A), and state law usually determineswhether a person has such a right, see Travelers Casualty & Surety 
Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U. S. 443, 450–451. 
The relevant Alabama law provides that a creditor has the right to 
payment of a debt even after the limitations period has expired. 

Johnson argues that the word “claim” means “enforceable claim.”
But the word “enforceable” does not appear in the Code’s definition, 
and Johnson’s interpretation is difficult to square with Congress’s intent 
“to adopt the broadest available definition of ‘claim,’ ” Johnson v. 
Home State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 83. Other Code provisions are still 


Syllabus 

more difficult to square with Johnson’s interpretation. For example, 
§502(b)(1) says that if a “claim” is “unenforceable” it will be disallowed, 
not that it is not a “claim.” Other provisions make clear thatthe running of a limitations period constitutes an affirmative defensethat a debtor is to assert after the creditor makes a “claim.” §§502, 

558. The law has long treated unenforceability of a claim (due to theexpiration of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense, and 
there is nothing misleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of 
claim that follows the Code’s similar system. 

Indeed, to determine whether a statement is misleading normally 
“requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience,” 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 383, n. 37, which in a Chapter 
13 bankruptcy includes a trustee who is likely to understand thata proof of claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has aright to payment that is subject to disallowance, including disallowance 
based on untimeliness. Pp. 2–5.

(b) Several circumstances, taken together, lead to the conclusion 
that Midland’s proof of claim was not “unfair” or “unconscionable” 
within the terms of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

Johnson points out that several lower courts have found or indicated 
that, in the context of an ordinary civil action to collect a debt, a 
debt collector’s assertion of a claim known to be time barred is “unfair.” 
But those courts rested their conclusions upon their concern 
that a consumer might unwittingly repay a time-barred debt. Such 
considerations have significantly diminished force in a Chapter 13bankruptcy, where the consumer initiates the proceeding, see §§301,303(a); where a knowledgeable trustee is available, see §1302(a);
where procedural rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims,
see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3001(c)(3)(A); and where the claims resolution 
process is “generally a more streamlined and less unnervingprospect for a debtor than facing a collection lawsuit,” In re Gate-
wood, 533 B. R. 905, 909. 

Also unpersuasive is Johnson’s argument that there is no legitimate 
reason for allowing a practice like this one that risks harm to 
the debtor. The bankruptcy system treats untimeliness as an affirmative 
defense and normally gives the trustee the burden of investigating 
claims to see if one is stale. And, at least on occasion, the assertion 
of even a stale claim can benefit the debtor. 

More importantly, a change in the simple affirmative-defense approach, 
carving out an exception, would require defining the exception’s 
boundaries. Does it apply only where a claim’s staleness appears 
on the face of the proof of claim? Does it apply to other 
affirmative defenses or only to the running of the limitations period? 
Neither the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act nor the Bankruptcy 


Syllabus 

Code indicates that Congress intended an ordinary civil court applying 
the Act to determine answers to such bankruptcy-related questions. 
The Act and the Code have different purposes and structuralfeatures. The Act seeks to help consumers by preventing consumer 
bankruptcies in the first place, while the Code creates and maintainsthe “delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations,” Kokoszka 
v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 651. Applying the Act in this context 
would upset that “delicate balance.” 

Contrary to the argument of the United States, the promulgation ofBankruptcy Rule 9011 did not resolve this issue. Pp. 5–10. 
823 F. 3d 1334, reversed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 
GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 


Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in thepreliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested tonotify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, 
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in orderthat corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–348 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PETITIONER v. 
ALEIDA JOHNSON 


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 


[May 15, 2017] 


JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 91 Stat. 874, 15 

U. S. C. §1692 et seq., prohibits a debt collector from asserting 
any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” 
or using any “unfair or unconscionable means” tocollect, or attempt to collect, a debt, §§1692e, 1692f. In 
this case, a debt collector filed a written statement in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding claiming that thedebtor owed the debt collector money. The statement 
made clear, however, that the 6-year statute of limitationsgoverning collection of the claimed debt had long since 
run. The question before us is whether the debt collector’s 
filing of that statement falls within the scope of the aforementioned 
provisions of the Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct. We conclude that it does not. 

I 
In March 2014, Aleida Johnson, the respondent, filed for 
personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code (or Code), 11 U. S. C. §1301 et seq, in the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. Two 
months later, Midland Funding, LLC, the petitioner, filed 


Opinion of the Court 

a “proof of claim,” a written statement asserting thatJohnson owed Midland a credit-card debt of $1,879.71. 
The statement added that the last time any charge appeared 
on Johnson’s account was in May 2003, more than 
10 years before Johnson filed for bankruptcy. The relevant 
statute of limitations is six years. See Ala. Code §6–
2–34 (2014). Johnson, represented by counsel, objected to 
the claim; Midland did not respond to the objection; andthe Bankruptcy Court disallowed the claim. 

Subsequently, Johnson brought this lawsuit againstMidland seeking actual damages, statutory damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs for a violation of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act. See 15 U. S. C. §1692k. The 
District Court decided that the Act did not apply andtherefore dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and reversed the DistrictCourt. 823 F. 3d 1334 (2016). Midland filed a petition for 
certiorari, noting a division of opinion among the Courts of 
Appeals on the question whether the conduct at issue hereis “false,” “deceptive,” “misleading,” “unconscionable,” or“unfair” within the meaning of the Act. Compare ibid. 
(finding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applicable) 
with In re Dubois, 834 F. 3d 522 (CA4 2016) (finding the 
Act inapplicable); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 

F. 3d 726 (CA7 2016) (same); and Nelson v. Midland 
Credit Management, Inc., 828 F. 3d 749 (CA8 2016) 
(same). We granted the petition. We now reverse the 
Court of Appeals. 

II 
Like the majority of Courts of Appeals that have considered 
the matter, we conclude that Midland’s filing of a 
proof of claim that on its face indicates that the limitationsperiod has run does not fall within the scope of any of the 
five relevant words of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act. We believe it reasonably clear that Midland’s proof of 


Opinion of the Court 

claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.” Midland’s 
proof of claim falls within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition 
of the term “claim.” A “claim” is a “right to payment.” 
11 U. S. C. §101(5)(A). State law usually determineswhether a person has such a right. See Travelers Casualty 
& Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 

U. S. 443, 450–451 (2007). The relevant state law is the 
law of Alabama. And Alabama’s law, like the law of many 
States, provides that a creditor has the right to payment ofa debt even after the limitations period has expired. See 
Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 S. 2d 288, 296 (Ala. 2007) 
(passage of time extinguishes remedy but the right remains); 
see also, e.g., Sallaz v. Rice, 161 Idaho 223, ___, 
384 P. 3d 987, 992–993 (2016) (similar); Notte v. Merchants 
Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N. J. 490, 499–500, 888 A. 2d 
464, 469 (2006) (similar); Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 
289 Md. 371, 375–376, 424 A. 2d 761, 764 (1981) (similar); 
Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 400–402, 112 

N. E. 2d 391, 394 (1953) (similar); DeVries v. Secretary of 
State, 329 Mich. 68, 75, 44 N. W. 2d 872, 876 (1950) (similar); 
Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 Ill. 343, 344–346, 40 N. E. 2d 
507, 508 (1942) (similar); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. 
Lackland, 175 Va. 178, 185–187, 8 S. E. 2d 306, 309 (1940) 
(similar); Insurance Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 728– 
731, 69 S. W. 345, 346 (1902) (similar); but see, e.g., Miss. 
Code Ann. §15–1–3(1) (2012) (expiration of the limitationsperiod extinguishes the remedy and the right); Wis. Stat.
§893.05 (2011–2012) (same). 

Johnson argues that the Code’s word “claim” means“enforceable claim.” She notes that this Court once referred 
to a bankruptcy “claim” as “an enforceable obligation.” 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 
495 U. S. 552, 559 (1990). And, she concludes, Midland’s 
“proof of claim” was false (or deceptive or misleading) 
because its “claim” was not enforceable. Brief for Respondent 
22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18– 


Opinion of the Court 

20 (making a similar argument). 

But we do not find this argument convincing. The word 
“enforceable” does not appear in the Code’s definition of 
“claim.” See 11 U. S. C. §101(5). The Court in Davenportlikely used the word “enforceable” descriptively, for thatcase involved an enforceable debt. 495 U. S., at 559. And 
it is difficult to square Johnson’s interpretation with our 
later statement that “Congress intended . . . to adopt the 
broadest available definition of ‘claim.’” Johnson v. Home 
State Bank, 501 U. S. 78, 83 (1991).

It is still more difficult to square Johnson’s interpretation 
with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 
502(b)(1) of the Code, for example, says that, if a“claim” is “unenforceable,” it will be disallowed. It does 
not say that an “unenforceable” claim is not a “claim.” 
Similarly, §101(5)(A) says that a “claim” is a “right to 
payment,” “whether or not such right is . . . fixed, contingent, 
. . . [or] disputed.” If a contingency does not arise, or 
if a claimant loses a dispute, then the claim is unenforce- 
able. Yet this section makes clear that the unenforceable 
claim is nonetheless a “right to payment,” hence a “claim,”
as the Code uses those terms. 

Johnson looks for support to other provisions that govern 
bankruptcy proceedings, including §502(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which states that a claim will be allowed 
in the absence of an objection, and Rule 3001(f ) of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which states 
that a properly filed “proof of claim . . . shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of theclaim.” But these provisions do not discuss the scope of 
the term “claim.” Rather, they restate the BankruptcyCode’s system for determining whether a claim will be 
allowed. Other provisions make clear that the running of 
a limitations period constitutes an affirmative defense, adefense that the debtor is to assert after a creditor makes 
a “claim.” §§502, 558. The law has long treated unen



Opinion of the Court 

forceability of a claim (due to the expiration of the limitations 
period) as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1); 13 Encyclopaedia of Pleading and 
Practice 200 (W. McKinney ed. 1898). And we see nothingmisleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of claimthat, in effect, follows the Code’s similar system. 

Indeed, to determine whether a statement is misleading 
normally “requires consideration of the legal sophistication 
of its audience.” Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 
350, 383, n. 37 (1977). The audience in Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
cases includes a trustee, 11 U. S. C. §1302(a), who 
must examine proofs of claim and, where appropriate,
pose an objection, §§704(a)(5), 1302(b)(1) (including any 
timeliness objection, §§502(b)(1), 558). And that trustee is 
likely to understand that, as the Code says, a proof of 
claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has a 
right to payment subject to disallowance (includingdisallowance based upon, and following, the trustee’sobjection for untimeliness). §§101(5)(A), 502(b), 704(a)(5), 
1302(b)(1). (We do not address the appropriate standardin ordinary civil litigation.) 

III 
Whether Midland’s assertion of an obviously time-
barred claim is “unfair” or “unconscionable” (within the 
terms of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) presents a 
closer question. First, Johnson points out that several 
lower courts have found or indicated that, in the context of 
an ordinary civil action to collect a debt, a debt collector’s 
assertion of a claim known to be time barred is “unfair.” 
See, e.g., Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 
1079 (CA7 2013) (holding as much); Kimber v. Federal 
Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (MD Ala. 1987) 
(same); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management, 641 F. 3d 
28, 32–33 (CA3 2011) (indicating as much); Castro v. 
Collecto, Inc., 634 F. 3d 779, 783 (CA5 2011) (same); Frey



Opinion of the Court 

ermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F. 3d 767, 771 
(CA8 2001) (same). 

We are not convinced, however, by this precedent. It 
considers a debt collector’s assertion in a civil suit of a 
claim known to be stale. We assume, for argument’s sake, 
that the precedent is correct in that context (a matter this 
Court itself has not decided and does not now decide). But 
the context of a civil suit differs significantly from the 
present context, that of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. 
The lower courts rested their conclusions upon theirconcern that a consumer might unwittingly repay a time-
barred debt. Thus the Seventh Circuit pointed out that“‘few unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a 
statute of limitations could be used to defend against 
lawsuits based on stale debts.’” Phillips, supra, at 1079 
(quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). The “‘passage of time,’” 
the Circuit wrote, “‘dulls the consumer’s memory of the 
circumstances and validity of the debt’” and the consumer 
may no longer have “‘personal records.’” 736 F. 3d, at 
1079 (quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). Moreover, a consumer 
might pay a stale debt simply to avoid the cost and 
embarrassment of suit. 736 F. 3d, at 1079. 

These considerations have significantly diminished forcein the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The consumer 
initiates such a proceeding, see 11 U. S. C. §§301, 303(a), 
and consequently the consumer is not likely to pay a stale 
claim just to avoid going to court. A knowledgeable trustee 
is available. See §1302(a). Procedural bankruptcy 
rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims. See 
Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3001(c)(3)(A); Advisory Committee’s 
Notes on Rule 3001–2011 Amdt., 11 U. S. C. App., p. 

678. And, as the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy AppellatePanel put it, the claims resolution process is “generally amore streamlined and less unnerving prospect for a debtor 
than facing a collection lawsuit.” In re Gatewood, 533 

B. R. 905, 909 (2015); see also, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §502 (out



Opinion of the Court 

lining generally the claims resolution process). These 
features of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding make it 
considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon a 
stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance,
objection, and disallowance. 

Second, Johnson argues that the practice at least risks 
harm to the debtor and that there is not “a single legitimate 
reason” for allowing this kind of behavior. Brief for 
Respondent 32. Would it not be obviously “unfair,” sheasks, for a debt collector to adopt a practice of buying upstale claims cheaply and asserting them in bankruptcyknowing they are stale and hoping for careless trustees? 
The United States, supporting Johnson, adds its view thatthe Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure make the 
practice open to sanction, and argues that sanctionable 
conduct is unfair conduct. Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 20. See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 9011(b)(2) 
(sanction possible if party violates the Rule that by “presenting 
to the [bankruptcy] court” any “paper,” a “party iscertifying that to the best of ” his or her “knowledge, . . .
the claims . . . therein are warranted by existing law”).

We are ultimately not persuaded by these arguments.
The bankruptcy system, as we have already noted, treatsuntimeliness as an affirmative defense. The trustee normally 
bears the burden of investigating claims and pointing 
out that a claim is stale. See supra, at 4–5. Moreover, 
protections available in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding 
minimize the risk to the debtor. See supra, at 6. And, 
at least on occasion, the assertion of even a stale claim can 
benefit a debtor. Its filing and disallowance “discharge[s]” 
the debt. 11 U. S. C. §1328(a). And that discharge meansthat the debt (even if unenforceable) will not remain on a 
credit report potentially affecting an individual’s ability to 
borrow money, buy a home, and perhaps secure employment. 
See 15 U. S. C. §1681c(a)(4) (debt may remain on a 
credit report for seven years); cf. Ala. Code §6–2–34 (6



Opinion of the Court 

year statute of limitations); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. §5–101 (2013) (3-year statute of limitations); cf. 16CFR pt. 600, App. §607, ¶6 (1991) (a credit report may 
include discharged debt only if “the debt [is reported] ashaving a zero balance due to reflect the fact that the consumer 
is no longer liable for the discharged debt”); FTC, 
40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act:
An FTC Staff Report with Summary of Interpretations 66 
(2011) (similar).

More importantly, a change in the simple affirmative-
defense approach, carving out an exception, itself would 
require defining the boundaries of the exception. Does it 
apply only where (as Johnson alleged in the complaint) a 
claim’s staleness appears “on [the] face” of the proof ofclaim? Does it apply to other affirmative defenses or only 
to the running of a limitations period?

At the same time, we do not find in either the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act or the Bankruptcy Code goodreason to believe that Congress intended an ordinary civil 
court applying the Act to determine answers to these 
bankruptcy-related questions. The Act and the Code have 
different purposes and structural features. The Act seeks 
to help consumers, not necessarily by closing what Johnson 
and the United States characterize as a loophole in 
the Bankruptcy Code, but by preventing consumer bankruptcies 
in the first place. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §1692(a) 
(recognizing the “abundant evidence of the use of abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices [which]
contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies”); see 
also §1692(b) (“Existing laws and procedures . . . are inadequate 
to protect consumers”); §1692(e) (statute seeks to 
“eliminate abusive debt collection practices”). The Bankruptcy 
Code, by way of contrast, creates and maintains 
what we have called the “delicate balance of a debtor’s 
protections and obligations.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 

U. S. 642, 651 (1974). 


To find the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applicable 
here would upset that “delicate balance.” From a sub-
stantive perspective it would authorize a new significant 
bankruptcy-related remedy in the absence of language inthe Code providing for it. Administratively, it would 
permit postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court 
concerning a creditor’s state of mind—a matter often hard 
to determine. See 15 U. S. C. §1692k(c) (safe harbor for 
any debt collector who “shows by a preponderance of evidence 
that the violation was not intentional and resulted 
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of 
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error”).
Procedurally, it would require creditors (who assert aclaim) to investigate the merits of an affirmative defense 
(typically the debtor’s job to assert and prove) lest the 
creditor later be found to have known the claim was untimely. 
The upshot could well be added complexity,
changes in settlement incentives, and a shift from thedebtor to the creditor the obligation to investigate the 
staleness of a claim. 

Unlike the United States, we do not believe that the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
settled the issue when it promulgated Bankruptcy Rule 
9011. The Committee, in considering amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 2009, specificallyrejected a proposal that would have required a creditor tocertify that there is no valid statute of limitations defense. 
See Agenda Book for Meeting 86–87 (Mar. 26–27, 2009). 
It did so in part because the working group did not want to 
impose an affirmative obligation on a creditor to make aprefiling investigation of a potential time-bar defense. 
Ibid. In rejecting that proposal, the Committee did notethat Rule 9011 imposes a general “obligation on a claimant 
to undertake an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances 
to determine . . . that a claim is warranted byexisting law and that factual contentions have evidentiary 


Opinion of the Court 

support,” and to certify as much on the proof of claim. Id., 
at 87. The Committee also acknowledged, however, thatthis requirement would “not addres[s] the statute of limitation 
issue,” but would only ensure “the accuracy of the 
information provided.” Ibid. 

We recognize that one Bankruptcy Court has held that 
filing a time-barred claim without a prefiling investigation 
of a potential time-bar defense merits sanctions underRule 9011. In re Sekema, 523 B. R. 651, 654 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 
ND Ind. 2015). But others have held to the contrary. See, 
e.g., In re Freeman, 540 B. R. 129, 143–144 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 
ED Pa. 2015); In re Jenkins, 538 B. R. 129, 134–136 
(Bkrcty. Ct. ND Ala. 2015); In re Keeler, 440 B. R. 354, 
366–369 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 2009); see also In re Andrews, 
394 B. R. 384, 387–388 (Bkrtcy. Ct. EDNC 2008) (recognizing 
that “[m]any courts have . . . found that sanctions[under Rule 9011] were not warranted for filing stale 
claims”).

These circumstances, taken together, convince us thatwe cannot find the practice at issue here “unfair” or “unconscionable” 
within the terms of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act. 

IV 
For these reasons, we conclude that filing (in a Chapter 
13 bankruptcy proceeding) a proof of claim that is obviously 
time barred is not a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair,
or unconscionable debt collection practice within the 
meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The 
judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–348 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, PETITIONER v. 
ALEIDA JOHNSON 


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 


[May 15, 2017] 


JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 
and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or Act)
prohibits professional debt collectors from using “false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means inconnection with the collection of any debt” and from“us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect” a debt.
15 U. S. C. §§1692e, 1692f. The Court today wrongfullyholds that a debt collector that knowingly attempts tocollect a time-barred debt in bankruptcy proceedings hasviolated neither of these prohibitions. 

Professional debt collectors have built a business out of 
buying stale debt, filing claims in bankruptcy proceedingsto collect it, and hoping that no one notices that the debt is 
too old to be enforced by the courts. This practice is both 
“unfair” and “unconscionable.” I respectfully dissent fromthe Court’s conclusion to the contrary.1 

I 

Americans owe trillions of dollars in consumer debt to 
creditors—credit card companies, schools, and car dealers, 
—————— 

1Because I believe the practice at issue here is “unfair” and “unconscionable,” 
and thus violates 15 U. S. C. §1692f, I do not address the 
Court’s conclusion that the practice is not “false, deceptive, or misleading” 
in violation of §1692e. 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

among others. See Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Quarterly 
Report on Household Debt and Credit 3 (2017). Most 
people will repay their debts, but some cannot do so. The 
debts they do not pay are increasingly likely to end up in 
the hands of professional debt collectors—companieswhose business it is to collect debts that are owed to other 
companies. See Consumer Financial Protection Bur., Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act: Annual Report 2016, p. 8(CFPB Report). Debt collection is a lucrative and growing 
industry. Last year, the Nation’s 6,000 debt collection 
agencies earned over $13 billion in revenue. Ibid. 

Although many debt collectors are hired by creditors towork on a third-party basis, more and more collectors also 
operate as “debt buyers”—purchasing debts from creditorsoutright and attempting to collect what they can, with the 
profits going to their own accounts.2 See FTC, The Structure 
and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry 11–12 
(2013) (FTC Report); CFPB Report 10. Debt buyers now 
hold hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer debt; 
indeed, a study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in 2009 found that nine of the leading debt 
buyers had purchased over $140 billion in debt just in the 
previous three years. FTC Report, at i–ii, T–3 (Table 3).

Because creditors themselves have given up trying tocollect the debts they sell to debt buyers, they sell those 
debts for pennies on the dollar. Id., at 23. The older the 
debt, the greater the discount: While debt buyers pay closeto eight cents per dollar for debts under three years old, 
they pay as little as two cents per dollar for debts greaterthan six years old, and “effectively nothing” for debtsgreater than 15 years old. Id., at 23–24. These prices 

—————— 
2A case pending before this Court, Henson v. Santander Consumer 
USA Inc., No. 16–349, asks whether a certain kind of debt buyer is a“debt collector” under the FDCPA. Midland does not dispute that it is a 
debt collector under the Act. 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

reflect the basic fact that older debts are harder to collect. 
As time passes, consumers move or forget that they owethe debts; creditors have more trouble documenting the 
debts and proving their validity; and debts begin to fall 
within state statutes of limitations—time limits that 
“operate to bar a plaintiff ’s suit” once passed. CTS Corp. 

v. Waldburger, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5). 
Because a creditor (or a debt collector) cannot enforce atime-barred debt in court, the debt is inherently worthvery little indeed.

But statutes of limitations have not deterred debt buyers. 
For years, they have filed suit in state courts—often 
in small-claims courts, where formal rules of evidence do 
not apply—to collect even debts too old to be enforced bythose courts.3 See Holland, The One Hundred Billion 
Dollar Problem in Small-Claims Court, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. 

L. 259, 261 (2011). Importantly, the debt buyers’ onlyhope in these cases is that consumers will fail either to 
invoke the statute of limitations or to respond at all: Inmost States the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense, meaning that a consumer must appear in court 
and raise it in order to dismiss the suit. See ante, at 4–5 
(majority opinion). But consumers do fail to defend themselves 
in court—in fact, according to the FTC, over 90% 
fail to appear at all. FTC Report 45. The result is that 
debt buyers have won “billions of dollars in default judgments” 
simply by filing suit and betting that consumerswill lack the resources to respond. Holland, supra, at 263. 

The FDCPA’s prohibitions on “misleading” and “unfair” 
conduct have largely beaten back this particular practice.
Every court to have considered the question has held that 

—————— 
3Petitioner’s parent alone filed 245,000 lawsuits in 2009. See Silver-
Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—in Lawsuits,
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2010, pp. A1, A16. Petitioner itself filed 
110 lawsuits on just one date in a single state court. Id., at A1. 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

a debt collector that knowingly files suit in court to collecta time-barred debt violates the FDCPA. See Phillips v. 
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 1079 (CA7 2013); 
Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480,1487 (MD Ala. 1987); see also ante, at 5–6 (majority opinion) 
(citing other cases). In 2015, petitioner and its parentcompany entered into a consent decree with the Government 
prohibiting them from filing suit to collect time-
barred debts and ordering them to pay $34 million inrestitution. See Consent Order in In re Encore Capital 
Group, Inc., No. 2015–CFPB–0022 (Sept. 9, 2015), pp. 38, 

46. And the leading trade association has now adopted a 
resolution barring the practice. See Brief for DBA International, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae 2–3. 

Stymied in state courts, the debt buyers have now 
turned to a new forum: bankruptcy courts. The same debt 
buyers that for years filed thousands of lawsuits in statecourts across the country have begun to do the same thing 
in bankruptcy courts—specifically, in cases governed by 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows consumers 
earning regular incomes to restructure their debts and 
repay as many as they can over a period of several years. 
See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1300.01 (A. Resnick & H. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016). As in ordinary civil cases, adebtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding is entitled 
to have dismissed any claim filed against his estate that is 
barred by a statute of limitations. See 11 U. S. C. §558.
As in ordinary civil cases, the statute of limitations is anaffirmative defense, one that must be raised by either the 
debtor or the trustee of his estate before it is honored. 
§§502, 558. And so—just as in ordinary civil cases—debtcollectors may file claims in bankruptcy proceedings for 
stale debts and hope that no one notices that they are tooold to be enforced. 

And that is exactly what the debt buyers have done. As 
a wide variety of courts and commentators have observed, 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

debt buyers have “deluge[d]” the bankruptcy courts withclaims “on debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes 
of limitations.” Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 
758 F. 3d 1254, 1256 (CA11 2014); see also In re Jenkins, 
456 B. R. 236, 239, n. 2 (Bkrtcy. Ct. EDNC 2011) (noting a 
“plague of stale claims”); Brief for National Association of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys et al. as Amici Curiae 9 
(noting study describing “hundreds of thousands of proofs 
of claim asserting hundreds of millions of dollars of consumer 
indebtedness, all in a single year”). This practice 
has become so widespread that the Government sued one 
debt buyer last year “to address [its] systemic abuse of the 
bankruptcy process”—including a “business model” of 
“knowingly and strategically” filing thousands of claimsfor time-barred debt. Complaint in In re Freeman-Clay v. 
Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P., No. 14–41871 (Bkrtcy. Ct. 
WD Mo.), ¶¶1, 35 (Resurgent Complaint). This practice,
the Government explained, “manipulates the bankruptcyprocess by systematically shifting the burden” to trustees 
and debtors to object even to “frivolous claims”—especially 
given that filing an objection is costly, time consuming, 
and easy to overlook. Id., at ¶¶35, 43–44. 

II 
The FDCPA prohibits professional debt collectors from 
engaging in “unfair” and “unconscionable” practices. 15 

U. S. C. §1692f.4 Filing a claim in bankruptcy court for 

—————— 
4This Court has not had occasion to construe the terms “unfair” and 
“unconscionable” in §1692f. The FDCPA’s legislative history suggeststhat Congress intended these terms as a backstop that would enable 
“courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct . . . not 
specifically addressed” by the statute. S. Rep. No. 95–382, p. 4 (1977). 
Courts have construed these terms, consistent with other federal and 
state statutes that employ them, to borrow from equitable and common-
law traditions. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F. 3d 
1185, 1200–1201 (CA11 2010) (per curiam); Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, 
Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F. 3d 470, 473–474 (CA7 2007). 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

debt that a collector knows to be time barred—like filing a 
lawsuit in a court to collect such a debt—is just such apractice. 

A 
Begin where the debt collectors themselves began: with 
their practice of filing suit in ordinary civil courts to collect 
debts that they know are time barred. Every court to have 
considered this practice holds that it violates the FDCPA.
There is no sound reason to depart from this conclusion. 
Statutes of limitations “are not simply technicalities.” 
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 

U. S. 478, 487 (1980). They reflect strong public-policy 
determinations that “it is unjust to fail to put [an] adversary 
on notice to defend within a specified period of time.” 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979). And 
they “promote justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342, 348–349 (1944). Such 
concerns carry particular weight in the context of small-
dollar consumer debt collection. As one thoughtful opinion 
explains: 

“Because few unsophisticated consumers would beaware that a statute of limitations could be used to 
defend against lawsuits based on stale debts, suchconsumers would unwittingly acquiesce to such lawsuits. 
And, even if the consumer realizes that she can 
use time as a defense, she will more than likely stillgive in rather than fight the lawsuit because she muststill expend energy and resources and subject herselfto the embarrassment of going into court to presentthe defense . . . .” Kimber, 668 F. Supp., at 1487. 

Debt buyers’ efforts to pursue stale debt in ordinary civil 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

litigation may also entrap debtors into forfeiting their timedefenses altogether. When a debt collector sues or threatens 
to sue to collect a debt, many consumers respond byoffering a small partial payment to forestall suit. In manyStates, a consumer who makes an offer like this has— 
unbeknownst to him—forever given up his ability to claimthe debt is unenforceable. That is because in most States 
a consumer’s partial payment on a time-barred debt—orhis promise to resume payments on such a debt—will 
restart the statute of limitations. FTC Report 47; see, e.g., 
Young v. Sorenson, 47 Cal. App. 3d 911, 914, 121 Cal. 
Rptr. 236, 237 (1975) (“‘The theory on which this is basedis that the payment is an acknowledgement on the existence 
of the indebtedness which raises an implied promise 
to continue the obligation and to pay the balance’”). Debt 
collectors’ efforts to entrap consumers in this way have noplace in honest business practice. 

B 
The same dynamics are present in bankruptcy proceedings. 
A proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court representsthe debt collector’s belief that it is entitled to payment,
even though the debt should not be enforced as a matter ofpublic policy. The debtor’s claim will be allowed, and will 
be incorporated in a debtor’s payment plan, unless the 
debtor or his trustee objects. But such objections requireordinary and unsophisticated people (and their overworked 
trustees) to be on guard not only against mistakenclaims but also against claims that debt collectors knowwill fail under law if an objection is raised. Debt collectors 
do not file these claims in good faith; they file them hoping 
and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail. Such 
a practice is “unfair” and “unconscionable” in violation of 
the FDCPA. 
The Court disagrees. But it does so on narrow grounds. 
To begin with, the Court does not hold that the Bankruptcy 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Code altogether displaces the FDCPA, leaving it withno role to play in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a conclusion 
would be wrong. Although the Code and the FDCPA 
“have different purposes and structural features,” ante, at 
8, the Court has held that Congress, in passing the 
FDCPA’s predecessor, did so on the understanding that 
“the provisions and the purposes” of the two statutes were 
intended to “coexist.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 
650 (1974). Although petitioner suggests that the FDCPA 
is best read “to have no application to [a] debt collector’sconduct” in a bankruptcy proceeding, Brief for Petitioner 
41, the majority declines its invitation to adopt such a 
sweeping rule.5 

Nor does the majority take a position on whether a debtcollector violates the FDCPA by filing suit in an ordinary 
court to collect a debt it knows is time barred. Ante, at 6. 
Instead, the majority concludes, even assuming that such 
a practice would violate the FDCPA, a debt collector does 

—————— 

5The majority does lean heavily on its fear that, were we to conclude 
that the FDCPA bars the practice at issue, we would be licensing“postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court” concerning matters 
best left to bankruptcy courts. Ante, at 9. But to do so would not, 
as the majority suggests, “upset [the] ‘delicate balance’ ” struck by the 
Code. Ibid. (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S., at 651). For one, 
nothing requires a debtor to engage in satellite litigation in order to sue 
a debt collector under the FDCPA; a debtor can easily file an adversaryproceeding asserting an FDCPA claim with the bankruptcy court itself, 
and in many cases will be better served by doing so. See, e.g., Simon v. 
FIA Card Servs., N. A., 732 F. 3d 259, 263 (CA3 2013). Nor is there anyrisk that finding the FDCPA applicable here will authorize bankruptcy 
courts (or, for that matter, civil courts) to engage in novel and unfettered 
inquiries into “a creditor’s state of mind.” Ante, at 9. Both Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 11 and its bankruptcy counterpart, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. 
Proc. 9011, authorize a court to impose sanctions on parties who 
willfully file meritless claims (a category that includes the debt buyershere, see In re Sekema, 523 B. R. 651, 654–655 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind. 
2015)). So there is nothing new about the inquiry that courts would berequired to undertake; it is no different than analyses they conductevery day. 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

not violate the Act by doing the same thing in bankruptcy 
proceedings. Bankruptcy, the majority argues, is different. 
True enough. But none of the distinctions that the 
majority identifies bears the weight placed on it. 

First, the majority contends, structural features of the 
bankruptcy process reduce the risk that a stale debt will 
go unnoticed and thus be allowed. Ante, at 6–7. But there 
is virtually no evidence that the majority’s theory holds 
true in practice. The majority relies heavily on the presence 
of a bankruptcy trustee, appointed to act on thedebtor’s behalf and empowered to (among other things) 
object to claims that he believes lack merit. See 11 

U. S. C. §§704(a)(5), 1302(b). In the majority’s view, thetrustee’s gatekeeping role makes it “considerably more 
likely that an effort to collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy 
will be met with resistance, objection, and disallowance.” 
Ante, at 7. The problem with the majority’s ipse 
dixit is that everyone with actual experience in the matterinsists that it is false. The Government, which oversees 
bankruptcy trustees, tells us that trustees “cannot realistically 
be expected to identify every time-barred . . . claimfiled in every bankruptcy.” Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 25–26; see also Resurgent Complaint ¶43 
(“Filing objections to all of [one collector]’s unenforceableclaims would clog the docket of this Court and other courtswith objections to frivolous claims”). The trustees themselves 
(appearing here as amici curiae) agree, describingthe practice as “wasteful” and “exploit[ative].” Brief for 
National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees as 
Amicus Curiae 12. And courts across the country recognize 
that Chapter 13 trustees are struggling under a 
“deluge” of stale debt. Crawford, 758 F. 3d, at 1256. 

Second, the other features of the bankruptcy processthat the majority believes will serve as a backstop against 
frivolous claims are even less likely to do so in practice. 
The majority implies that a person who files for bankruptcy 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

is more sophisticated than the average consumer debtor 
because the initiation of bankruptcy is a choice made by a 
debtor. Ante, at 6. But a person who has filed for bankruptcy 
will rarely be in such a superior position; he has, 
after all, just declared that he is unable to meet his financial 
obligations and in need of the assistance of the courts.
It is odd to speculate that such a person is better situated 
to monitor court filings and lodge objections than an ordinary 
consumer. The majority also suggests that the rules 
of bankruptcy help “guide the evaluation of claims.” Ibid. 
But the rules of bankruptcy in fact facilitate the allowance 
of claims: Claims are automatically allowed and made part 
of a plan unless an objection is made. See 11 U. S. C. 
§502(a). A debtor is arguably more vulnerable in bankruptcy—
not less—to the oversights that the debt buyers 
know will occur. 

Finally, the majority suggests, in some cases a consumer 
will actually benefit if a claim for an untimely debt is filed. 
Ante, at 7–8. If such a claim is filed but disallowed, the 
majority explains, the debt will eventually be discharged, 
and the creditor will be barred from collecting it. See 
§1328(a). Here, too, practice refutes the majority’s rosy 
portrait of these proceedings. A debtor whose trustee does 
not spot and object to a stale debt will find no comfort in 
the knowledge that other consumers with more attentive 
trustees may have their debts disallowed and discharged.
Moreover, given the high rate at which debtors are unable 
to fully pay off their debts in Chapter 13 proceedings, seePorter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of 
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 Texas L. Rev. 103, 111–112 
(2011), most debtors who fail to object to a stale claim will 
end up worse off than had they never entered bankruptcy 
at all: They will make payments on the stale debts, therebyresuscitating them, see supra, at 6–7, and may thus 
walk out of bankruptcy court owing more to their creditorsthan they did when they entered it. There is no benefit to 


SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

anyone in such a proceeding—except the debt collectors. 

* * * 
It does not take a sophisticated attorney to understand 
why the practice I have described in this opinion is unfair.
It takes only the common sense to conclude that one 
should not be able to profit on the inadvertent inattention 
of others. It is said that the law should not be a trap for 
the unwary. Today’s decision sets just such a trap.
I take comfort only in the knowledge that the Court’sdecision today need not be the last word on the matter. If 
Congress wants to amend the FDCPA to make explicitwhat in my view is already implicit in the law, it need only 
say so.
I respectfully dissent.