In a major win for consumer debtors and the attorneys who represent them, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the District Court’s ruling in Warfield v. Nance, reaffirming that debtors may amend their bankruptcy exemptions even after earlier claims have been denied. The decision safeguards the principle that exemptions must be liberally construed in favor of debtors and upholds the right to a genuine “fresh start.”
[Read more…] about Ninth Circuit Rejects Claim Preclusion in Successive Exemption ClaimsTenth Circuit Affirms Exemption of Child Tax Credit Refunds in Garcia-Morales
In Cohen v. Garcia-Morales, No. 24-1384 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025), the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a Chapter 7 debtor’s federal tax refund, traceable to a refundable child tax credit, must be turned over to the bankruptcy trustee. Affirming both the bankruptcy and district courts, the panel held that the refund was wholly exempt under Colorado law.
[Read more…] about Tenth Circuit Affirms Exemption of Child Tax Credit Refunds in Garcia-MoralesLangston v. Dallas: The Fifth Circuit’s Chance to Reinforce the Finality of Bankruptcy Deadlines
In consumer bankruptcy, finality and procedural certainty are paramount. The ability of debtors to claim exemptions—and for creditors to challenge those claims—is governed by well-defined rules that ensure the timely administration of cases. Yet, in Langston v. Dallas Commodity Company, the courts have permitted an untimely objection to stand, raising critical concerns about the enforceability of procedural deadlines and the integrity of the bankruptcy process.
[Read more…] about Langston v. Dallas: The Fifth Circuit’s Chance to Reinforce the Finality of Bankruptcy DeadlinesFighting for Fairness: NCBRC, NACBA, and NCLC File Amicus Brief in Michigan Bankruptcy Exemptions Battle
“Michigan’s most vulnerable debtors deserve protection—not political obstruction.”
That’s the central argument made by the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center (NCBRC), the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA), and the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) in a critical amicus brief filed before the Michigan Court of Claims. These leading consumer advocacy organizations are weighing in on a legal battle that could determine the financial future of countless struggling Michiganders.
At issue is House Bill 4901 (HB 4901)—a long-overdue update to Michigan’s bankruptcy exemption laws that would allow debtors to keep their homes, cars, and basic assets while seeking financial relief. The bill passed both chambers of the Michigan Legislature. But in a stunning act of defiance, House Speaker Matt Hall and Clerk Scott Starr have refused to present the bill to Governor Gretchen Whitmer, effectively blocking it from becoming law.
[Read more…] about Fighting for Fairness: NCBRC, NACBA, and NCLC File Amicus Brief in Michigan Bankruptcy Exemptions BattleTenth Circuit to Decide Dispute Over Child Tax Credit Exemption in Bankruptcy
Facts
The Tenth Circuit is reviewing a case that centers on Colorado’s bankruptcy exemption statute, which allows debtors to exempt the “full amount” of tax refunds attributed to the Child Tax Credit (CTC). The debtor, Jose L. Garcia-Morales, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2021 and claimed an exemption for his $1,800 CTC, which resulted in a $1,455 tax refund.
The Chapter 7 trustee, Robertson Cohen, objected, arguing that the refund was only partially exempt and sought to retain $914.40 for the bankruptcy estate using a pro-rata allocation method. The bankruptcy court, and later the district court, sided with Garcia-Morales, finding that the entire refund was exempt under the plain meaning of the statute. The trustee has appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
[Read more…] about Tenth Circuit to Decide Dispute Over Child Tax Credit Exemption in BankruptcyThe 9th Circuit Holds A Homestead Exemption Is Limited to Statutory Cap in a Chapter 11 to 7 Conversion
The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to object to a claimed homestead exemption within the 30-day period does not allow the debtor to exempt more than the statutory limit when the case originated as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and included conflicting representations regarding the exemptions.
Facts
Monte and Rosana Masingale filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2015, claiming a homestead exemption of “100% of FMV” (fair market value) for their residence. No party in interest objected within the 30-day window. The case was later converted to Chapter 7, and the Masingales sought to sell the home and retain all proceeds, despite the statutory cap on the homestead exemption.
Analysis
The court’s legal analysis focused on whether the initial lack of objection to the homestead exemption claim allowed the Masingales to exempt more than the statutory limit. The court distinguished this case from Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz and Schwab v. Reilly, which involved different circumstances and did not originate in Chapter 11.
The court noted that the Masingales, as Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession, owed fiduciary duties to their creditors. During the Chapter 11 proceedings, they made representations in their Disclosure Statement and Chapter 11 Plan that they were not claiming above-limit exemptions or that such exemptions would only be allowed after creditors were fully paid. These representations indicated that the homestead exemption would be limited to the statutory cap, contrary to their Schedule C notation of “100% of FMV.”
The court reasoned that these conflicting representations within the 30-day objection period affected whether the “100% of FMV” notation created a clear and objectionable exemption. The court emphasized that the fiduciary duties and specific statements made in Chapter 11 documents provided context that negated the need for an early objection based solely on the Schedule C notation. Therefore, the initial failure to object did not permit the Masingales to claim an exemption above the statutory limit.
Tips
- Clarify Exemption Claims: Ensure that exemption claims are clear and consistent across all bankruptcy documents to avoid disputes and objections.
- Understand Fiduciary Duties: Recognize that debtors-in-possession in Chapter 11 have fiduciary duties to creditors, and their representations can impact exemption claims.
- Timely Objections: While objections to facially invalid exemptions should be timely, consider the entire context and any additional representations made by the debtor within the objection period.
NCBRC filed an amicus brief in support of the Debtors and provided a moot court to Debtors’ counsel to prepare for oral arguments.
The 9th Circuit Reviews Whether Res Judicata Applies to Exemptions
The 9th Circuit Court in Nance v Warfield is considering whether to overrule the District Court of Nevada which held that the bankruptcy court erred in overruling the trustee’s res judicata-based objection to the debtor’s federal exemptions in the property and RV. The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by sua sponte granting an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption.
Facts
Lawrence Warfield, the trustee of Johnie Lee Nance’s bankruptcy estate, objected to Nance’s claimed exemptions for his property and RV under Arizona law. After the court sustained the trustee’s objections, Nance amended his schedule to claim exemptions under Washington law, and the trustee again objected. When those objections were sustained, Nance amended his schedule to claim federal exemptions. The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee’s objections to these federal exemptions and sua sponte granted an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption.
Analysis
The district court analyzed the applicability of res judicata to the debtor’s successive exemption claims. It noted that claim preclusion, a form of res judicata, bars litigation of claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action. The court applied the three-part test for claim preclusion: identity of claims, final judgment on the merits, and identity or privity between parties. The court found that the debtor’s claims for exemptions in the property and RV, regardless of the legal framework (Arizona, Washington, or federal law), arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and involved the same property. Therefore, the claims were identical.
The court also determined that the previous rulings sustaining the trustee’s objections constituted final judgments on the merits, satisfying the second criterion. Finally, the parties involved in the objections were identical, fulfilling the third requirement for claim preclusion. Consequently, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in overruling the trustee’s objections based on res judicata.
Additionally, the court addressed the bankruptcy court’s sua sponte action to grant an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption. The court emphasized the principle of party presentation, which requires courts to decide only the questions presented by the parties. The court found that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by granting an exemption that the debtor had not claimed, noting that the debtor, represented by counsel, could have asserted the exemption but did not. Therefore, the court held that the bankruptcy court’s action was improper and reversed its decision.
NCBRC and NACBA filed an amicus brief in support of the Debtor/Appellant.
State Law Does Not Create Exemption in Trust
A state statute protecting a trust from judgment creditors is not an exemption statute for bankruptcy purposes where it was not designated as such and it did not provide unequivocal protection against all forms of collection. In re Morris, No. 21-30468 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2023).
In his chapter 7 bankruptcy schedules, the debtor listed an interest as a potential beneficiary in a trust that did not have a spendthrift provision. The debtor claimed an exemption for the interest under Illinois law, 735 ILCS 5/2-1403 (1999), which provides:
Judgment debtor as beneficiary of trust. No court, except as otherwise provided in this Section, shall order the satisfaction of a judgment out of any property held in trust for the judgment debtor if such trust has, in good faith, been created by, or the fund so held in trust has proceeded from, a person other than the judgment debtor. . . .
The trustee objected, arguing that the statute did not create a bankruptcy exemption.
Illinois is an opt-out state, so the court looked to state law to determine whether the trust interest would be exempt even though, unlike other specified exemptions like retirement plans and worker’s compensation awards, the statute at issue here did not create an explicit exemption. The court found that exemptions under the state laws are not limited to those so designated. Rather, “exempt property is any property that the legislature has identified and declared to be free from liability to processes such as seizure and sale, or attachment to satisfy debts.” The essential characteristic of an exemption “is simply whether the provision unequivocally protects the identified property against all forms of collection.”
In this case, the statute the debtor relied on was limited to protecting a debtor’s interest in a trust from judgment creditors. But the court found the chapter 7 trustee was merely gathering estate assets under section 541. He was not a judgment creditor nor was he attempting to collect on a judgment. The court quoted from In re Gutterridge, 2013 WL 395140 (Bankr. C.D. Ill., Jan. 31, 2013), discussing the same state statute, that “once a bankruptcy petition is filed, the Illinois statute in this case cannot apply to create an exemption to a trust that is otherwise simply an asset of the bankruptcy estate.”
The court noted that the grantors could have placed the trust out of reach under section 541(c)(2) by including a spendthrift provision. But the trust in this case did not do so.
The court rejected the debtor’s argument that because certain forms of collection such as levy, garnishment and attachment, all involve a judgment the state statute essentially applies to all collection actions. The court found no support for the argument in the language of the statute. Had the legislature intended to create an exemption, it could have done so.
The court concluded that the narrow language of the Illinois statute was not an “unequivocal” protection of the trust for bankruptcy exemption purposes. It sustained the trustee’s objection.
The Ninth Circuit Reviews Whether an Exemption of “100% of FMV” Protects the Entire Value of the Property Including any Post-Petition Appreciation
UPDATE: The Ninth Circuit has since decided this case. Click here to read our article discussing their ruling.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is considering whether an exemption of “100% of FMV” protects all the equity in the property, over and above the allowable exemption, and any appreciation in value post-petition. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court and found that an exemption claim of “100% of FMV” included the entire value of the property, not the allowable exemption. Further, the court held that this exemption claim included any post-petition appreciation because there was no objection to the exemption. Masingale v. Munding, 644 B.R. 530 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2022). The BAP held:
“Monte L. Masingale and Rosana D. Masingale filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and claimed a “100% of FMV [fair market value]” exemption in their homestead. No one objected. Years later, the bankruptcy court converted the case to chapter 7. Mrs. Masingale and the chapter 7 trustee disputed the amount of the homestead exemption to which Mrs. Masingale was entitled: the chapter 7 trustee argued that she was bound by the statutory limit under § 522(d)(1), but Mrs. Masingale contended that she was entitled to the entire fair market value of the property, because no one had objected to the claimed homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court agreed with the chapter 7 trustee and approved his request to sell the property, limiting the homestead exemption to $45,950.
“Mrs. Masingale appeals, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in determining the amount of the homestead exemption. We agree with Mrs. Masingale. We REVERSE the portions of the order on appeal that determine the amount of the homestead exemption and REMAND. We publish to explain the effect of a “100% of FMV” exemption claim and to reiterate that parties must timely object to any improper exemption claim, no matter how frivolous. …
“As a matter of first impression, we hold that the Masingales’ claim of an exemption equal to “100% of FMV” includes postpetition appreciation and becomes incontestable if there is no timely objection. The snapshot rule is one of the limits on a debtor’s entitlement to exemptions. Taylor holds that, if no one objects, the debtor can get the benefit of exemptions to which the debtor is not entitled. In other words, in order to get the benefit of the snapshot rule, a trustee or party in interest must object to an exemption claim that contradicts that rule.”
The case is tentatively set for oral argument in early December 2023.
Appellant Trustee Munding Brief
“Sham” Carve-Out Agreement Rejected
Calling the agreement a “sham,” the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of a carve-out agreement between the chapter 7 trustee and the state and federal tax creditors. The court found the agreement would adhere to no one’s benefit but their own. The court also upheld the bankruptcy court’s finding that the debtor’s homestead exemption applied to section 724(b). Summerlin v. Turnage (In re Turnage), No. 22-122 (W.D. N.C. March 14, 2023).
The 72-year-old widowed debtor living on Social Security income and help from her son, filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. She claimed an exemption of $55,000 in her home which she valued at $124,510.00. Her secured debts at the time of her petition totaled $231,788.29, and consisted of a mortgage on her home and both federal and state tax debts.
The chapter 7 trustee valued the debtor’s home at between $175,000 and $180,000. He objected to her exemption as inapplicable to her tax liens under North Carolina law. He then entered into a carve-out agreement with the debtor’s tax creditors under which he would receive $30,000 for his expenses and “[t]he IRS and NCDOR each get 60% of their secured tax liens. The remaining 40% carved out of the tax liens (approximately $38,000 after payment of the Trustee’s expenses) would be used to pay priority unsecured claims in full and the remainder would be disbursed pro rata among the general unsecured creditors.” He moved the court for authority to sell the property so he could carry out this distribution plan.
The bankruptcy court denied the motion to sell and overruled the objection to the debtor’s exemption. The trustee appealed to the district court.
The court found the appeal turned on application of section 724(b). In addition to establishing the order of distribution where tax liens are involved, that section provides that after the first mortgage is paid off, claimants holding certain types of priority claims may substitute in for the tax lien to the extent of the tax lien. The court noted that the only priority claim that would be available to substitute in for the tax lien would be the trustee’s own compensation, related primarily to the sale of the debtor’s home.
Notably, section 724(b) makes no provision for exemptions. Because North Carolina opted out of the federal exemptions, the court turned to state law to determine how the debtor’s homestead exemption would fare under a section 724(b) distribution scheme. It found state law emphasizes a liberal construction of exemption laws, favoring their application.
The court was unpersuaded by the trustee’s argument that permitting the debtor to take her homestead exemption would impinge on the tax liens. The court differentiated between the homestead exemption’s applicability to proceeds from sale of the home and its applicability to the tax liens themselves. It found that “once the tax agencies agree to the carve-out they cannot direct the allocation of the value created by such carve-out.”
Finally, the court noted with distaste that the carve-out benefited only the trustee and the tax agencies. It stated: “for her ‘fresh start,’ the Debtor, a 72- year-old widow with no meaningful source of income, loses her home and gets no more than a check for about $2,000. The minimal benefit to the other general unsecured creditors does not obscure the reality of this agreement.”
The court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the Debtor’s homestead exemption applies to section 724(b) and its denial of the Motion to Sell.