National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center

Protecting The Rights Of Consumer Debtors In Bankruptcy

Discharge Injunction

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Court Has Discretion to Deny Arbitration in Discharge Injunction Case

The Fifth Circuit found that the test it established in In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1059, 1069 (5th Cir. 1997), was still good law notwithstanding the intervening case of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and that, under National Gypsum, the bankruptcy properly exercised its discretion to deny the creditor’s motion to compel arbitration in an action alleging discharge injunction violation. Henry v. Educ. Fin. Serv., No 18-20809 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2019).

NCBRC, NACBA and Professor Jay Westbrook provided an amicus brief, authored by NACBA member Allan Gropper, in support of the debtor in this case.

Stephanie Henry filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy ten years after entering into a student loan contract with Wells Fargo’s predecessor. After she successfully completed her five-year plan, Wells Fargo sent her a letter containing language to the effect that it was attempting to collect the remaining debt on the loan. Ms. Henry filed an adversary proceeding alleging violation of the discharge injunction. Wells Fargo moved to compel arbitration in accordance with a clause in the lending agreement under which Ms. Henry agreed to have any complaint “arising under or relating to” the debt settled by arbitration. The bankruptcy court denied Wells Fargo’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis that the cause of action did not arise under or relate to the student loan contract. The court certified the case for interlocutory appeal directly to the Fifth Circuit. [Read more…] about Court Has Discretion to Deny Arbitration in Discharge Injunction Case

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Arbitration Clause Does Not Constrain Court’s Contempt Power

Finding that “[w]ords in a consumer agreement cannot deprive the bankruptcy court of the inherent power to enforce compliance with an injunction,” the district court found an arbitration clause in a consumer contract did not constrain the court’s contempt powers. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, LP v. Bateman, No. 14-5369, Adv. Proc. No. 18-1394 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2019).

Christopher Bateman filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy listing Verizon as an unsecured creditor. Verizon did not acknowledge or take part in the bankruptcy in any way. Five months after Mr. Bateman obtained his discharge, Verizon sent him a letter attempting to collect the discharged debt. Mr. Bateman moved the court to hold Verizon in contempt for violation of the discharge injunction. In response, Verizon moved to compel arbitration, invoking its Customer Agreement with Mr. Bateman which provided that any dispute which “in any way relates to or arises out of” the agreement is subject to arbitration. The bankruptcy court found that its power to enforce its order was not subject to the terms of Mr. Bateman’s Customer Agreement with Verizon. [Read more…] about Arbitration Clause Does Not Constrain Court’s Contempt Power

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SCOTUS Adopts No Fair Ground of Doubt Standard for Discharge Order Violation

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that “a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the credi­tor’s conduct.” Taggart v. Lorenzen, No. 18-489, 587 U. S. ___ (June 3, 2019).

Chapter 7 debtor, Bradley Taggart, was involved in pre-petition litigation in state court at the time he filed for bankruptcy. After he obtained his discharge, Sherwood, an opposing party in the state court litigation, obtained a judgment against him. Sherwood then sought attorney’s fees, and the state court awarded those fees notwithstanding Ninth Circuit precedent making clear that the post-petition attorney’s fees were discharged along with Taggart’s other debts. The bankruptcy court found that Sherwood was aware of the discharge and intended the act that violated it and, under that standard, it held Sherwood in contempt of the discharge order. The bankruptcy appellate panel reversed the sanction award and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sherwood could not be held in contempt in light of its good faith belief that its conduct did not violate the discharge injunction regardless of whether that belief was reasonable. [Read more…] about SCOTUS Adopts No Fair Ground of Doubt Standard for Discharge Order Violation

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Rejection of Unexpired Lease Equals Pre-Petition Breach of Lease Agreement

Under section 365(g), rejection of an unexpired lease is treated as breach of the lease contract not termination of the lease. Therefore, the lessor’s claim against the debtors for rent based on post-petition, post-rejection occupancy of the leased property was part of the pre-petition breach and was discharged in the debtors’ chapter 7 bankruptcy. In re Roberson, No. 17-8041 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. May 30, 2019) (unpublished).

Joi and Anthony Roberson defaulted on their lease midway through their lease term. When the lessor, GCB Properties III, Ltd., initiated eviction proceedings, they filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy listing the defaulted rent as one of their debts. Neither the trustee nor the Robersons assumed the unexpired lease and the Robersons received their discharge. During the pendency of their bankruptcy case, GCB continued to try to evict them and the Robersons obtained a judgment against GCB for violation of the automatic stay. After discharge, GCB attempted to collect the rent for the months the Robersons lived in the property from the date of the statutory rejection of the lease through the date the Robersons moved out of the property. Furthermore, GCB applied the judgment against it as set-off against unpaid rent. The bankruptcy court found that the rental default up through the time the Robersons vacated the property was discharged in their bankruptcy and therefore the lessor was not entitled to set-off.

GCB appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit.

It was undisputed that, by operation of section 365(d)(1), the unexpired lease was automatically rejected 60 days post-petition when neither the Robersons nor the chapter 7 trustee assumed it. The issue was what effect that rejection had on the ongoing unpaid rent as the Robersons continued to occupy the property. Relying on the recent case of Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, No. 17–1657, 587 U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2019 WL 2166392, at *9 (U.S. May 20, 2019), the BAP found that, under the express language of section 365(g)(1), rejection of the unexpired lease was tantamount to a breach of the rental agreement. Section 502(g)(1) provides that a claim based on a rejected unexpired lease agreement shall be allowed or disallowed “the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.” Section 727(b) includes in chapter 7 discharge any claim arising prior to the date of the petition. In Miller v. Chateau Cmtys, Inc. (In re Miller), 282 F.3d 874 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit found that when an expired lease is rejected, debt based on post-petition, post-rejection rent is considered part of the pre-petition breach and is therefore included in the discharge.

The BAP was unpersuaded by GCB’s argument that, once the lease was rejected, any unpaid rent due after that point was no longer a continuation of a pre-petition breach of the lease agreement, but was a new debt based on termination of the lease and the debtors’ status as holdover tenants under Ohio law. The BAP found that because both section 365(g)(1) and the holding in Mission teach that rejection of the lease is not the equivalent of termination but is deemed a breach of the lease agreement, the debtors did not become holdover tenants. While a landlord may take steps in accordance with the lease agreement or with Ohio landlord tenant law to terminate the lease upon breach, GCB did not do so in this case.

In conclusion, the panel offered the following caution: “The Panel cannot overstate the narrow gauge of this opinion, which is premised solely upon the conclusion that rejection of an unexpired lease under § 365(g) creates a breach of the lease, not a termination. Because GCB relied exclusively on its contrary view, the Panel finds no error in the bankruptcy court’s ruling.”

ROBERSON BAP 6th May 2019

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Ambush at State Trial Costs Creditor and Her Counsel over $200,000 for Discharge Injunction Violation

The creditor and her counsel were found liable for violation of the discharge injunction to the tune of over $200,000 after the creditor and her counsel blindsided the debtor during closing arguments in their state court litigation by grossly expanding the scope of the creditor’s claimed damages to encompass discharged debts. In re Renfrow, No. 17-1027 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. April 23, 2019). [Read more…] about Ambush at State Trial Costs Creditor and Her Counsel over $200,000 for Discharge Injunction Violation

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SCOTUS Hears Arguments on Discharge Violation Sanctions

Addressing the reach of a bankruptcy court’s contempt powers in the context of a violation of the discharge injunction, the Supreme Court heard arguments on April 24, in the case of Taggart v. Lorenzen, No. 18-489.

Daniel Geyser appeared for the debtor, Bradley Taggart. Nicole Saharsky represented the creditor, Shelley Lorenzen, executor. Sopan Joshi, from the office of the Solicitor General, argued as amicus not in support of either party. NACBA submitted an amicus brief in support of reversal.

The controversy hinged on a state court finding that Mr. Taggart’s creditor could seek contractual attorney fees in the litigation before it, even though those fees would have been subject to the discharge order injunction had Mr. Taggart not “returned to the fray.” The bankruptcy court found that the “returned to the fray” doctrine did not apply and that the litigation violated the discharge injunction. It awarded sanctions, at least in part representing the debtor’s attorney’s fees. The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the sanctions stating broadly that a creditor acting in good faith cannot be held liable for discharge injunction violation even if that belief is unreasonable. Lorenzen v. Taggart (In re Taggart), 888 F.3d 438 (9th Cir. 2018).

At the outset, all the parties agreed that the Ninth Circuit rule was incorrect. The parties agreed that in the case of a discharge violation, even one made in good faith, the bankruptcy court may order the creditor to cease the violation and restore any property taken.

Where there was disagreement between parties was in the application of the bankruptcy court’s contempt powers. Calling contempt a severe remedy, several of the Justices appeared concerned at its application in the context of discharge injunction where the creditor’s conduct was based on a “fair ground of doubt.”

The debtor advocated for the bankruptcy court’s discretion under section 105(a) to make the determination as to the nature of the creditor’s conduct and whether it merits sanctions, including attorney’s fees. The creditor has a “safe harbor” in Rule 4007 which allows it to seek guidance on the question of dischargeability from the bankruptcy court.

The government advocated for a purely objective test as to the reasonableness of the creditor’s belief that the discharge injunction did not apply. In Justice Gorsuch’s questioning, it appeared that an objective reasonableness would prevail even in the absence of the creditor’s subjective reasonableness (i.e. where there existed good reason to believe the conduct non-violative but the creditor was unaware of that good reason and went forward nonetheless.)

The creditor advocated a similar “reasonable good faith belief,” test as the government (though with the subjective element intact) emphasizing the “chilling effect” of requiring a creditor to jump through the Rule 4007 hoop to have dischargeability determined in an action before the bankruptcy court.

One concern expressed by several Justices was the establishment of a strict liability standard which put the creditor in a position of being permitted to seek a ruling on dischargeability from the state court but not be able to rely on that ruling as a defense to discharge injunction violation if the state court was in error.

The question of who should bear the burden of harm echoed throughout the questioning. Justice Kavanaugh noted to Mr. Geyser that under tradition rules of injunction good faith is a defense. Mr. Geyser disagreed stating that traditionally, the burden of uncertainty falls on the person subject to the decree. In a similar vein, Justice Kagan asked Ms. Saharsky: “As between the victim of the violation and the person who, with all the good faith in the world, perpetrated the violation, why shouldn’t we look to the person who perpetrated the violation?”

Justice Roberts, while noting the long history of the American Rule against fee-shifting, posited the possibility that a bankruptcy court could award sanctions for contempt using the debtor’s attorney’s fees as a reasonable number for that award.

See the SCOTUS blog for further discussion of the argument here.

Taggart SCt transcript April 2019

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Bankruptcy Court Joins Minority, Grants Discharge, and Denies the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss for Delinquent Post-Petition Mortgage Payments

On March 28, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona Denied the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss based on the Debtors’ post-petition mortgage default. In doing so, she joined the minority position on this issue.

The Debtors filed their Chapter 13 bankruptcy on July 18, 2014. Their plan proposed to pay back mortgage arrears to their mortgage lender through plan payments to the trustee. The plan also indicated that they would make direct payments to the mortgage lender for future monthly mortgage payments. At the end of the plan, the mortgage lender filed a Response to the Trustee’s Notice of Final Cure for Prepetition Arrears on the Mortgage Claim, agreeing that the prepetition default was cured, but stating that the post-petition payments due on and after September 1, 2017, were delinquent. The Trustee then filed a motion to dismiss.

The court addressed the issue of whether payments on a mortgage paid directly to the mortgage holder and referenced in a chapter 13 plan are “payments under the plan” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §1328(a) and if delinquent is a legitimate basis to dismiss the bankruptcy and deny a discharge.

Section 1328(a) states in pertinent part: “as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan,… the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan…” Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) allows a trustee to move to dismiss for cause including “material default by the debtor concerning a term of a confirmed plan;…” As a result several Chapter 13 trustees file motions to dismiss if they discover that a debtor is delinquent in mortgage payments.

There are two schools of interpretation of “payments under the plan.”

To read more click here.

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7th Circuit Reverses Bankruptcy Courts’ Uniform Rule to Keep Debtor’s Vehicle in Chapter 13 Post-Confirmation Estate

This opinion was based on the consolidated appeals of seven cases. Each of the seven debtors filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The uniform confirmation order in this district (in most cases) is that upon confirmation, the property of the estate remains property of the estate. City of Chi. v. Marshall, 281 F. Supp. 3d 702, 704 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

Thereafter, the debtors incurred fines as the registered owners of vehicles involved in parking or traffic violations of Chicago’s Municipal Code. In each bankruptcy case, the City of Chicago sought payment of the outstanding post-petition traffic fines as administrative expenses under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, which, under § 507(a), would give these claims priority status (second only to domestic support obligations), ahead of pre-petition creditors in the distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estates. Id.

Six of the seven cases were heard before Bankruptcy Judge Barnes. Judge Barnes’s oral ruling rejected Chicago’s argument. “He found that the City’s attempt to collect post-petition fines as administrative expenses had “a dangerous irritative effect, which is that the debtor could continue even after the first administrative expense claim for the life of the plan to incur additional tickets and they could be added to the plan,” depleting the assets available to unsecured creditors. (Citation omitted.) Judge Barnes concluded that “the traditional set of circumstances holds true, which is the debtor remains responsible for these claims,” and that the City had the same collections options as any post-petition creditor: it could move for relief from the stay and pursue state court remedies, or it could seek dismissal of the bankruptcy case. (Citation omitted.)” Id. at 705.

The seventh case was heard by Judge Hollis. She also rejected Chicago’s argument in a written opinion, In re Haynes, 569 B.R. 733 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017), finding that post-petition traffic tickets did not qualify as administrative expenses.

These cases were consolidated on appeal to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois which affirmed the Bankruptcy Courts’ decisions. City of Chi. v. Marshall, 281 F. Supp. 3d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2017).

Click here to read more.

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Sterling v. Southlake Nautilus Health and Racquett Club, Inc. , No. 18-2773 (7th Cir.)

Type: Amicus
Date: February 6, 2019
Description: Whether the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that a creditor and its law firm did not violate the discharge injunction when, after the Chapter 7 debtor’s discharge, she was arrested pursuant to a state court bench warrant that had been issued in supplemental collection proceedings against the debtor in state court.
Result: Pending

Sterling 7th Cir NACBA Amicus Feb 2019

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Bankruptcy Court holds Debtor is Entitled to Chapter 13 Discharge even if Co-Debtor is Delinquent on Post-Petition DSO Payments

A bankruptcy court recently reviewed the issue of whether a debtor can receive a discharge under § 1328 even if her co-debtor husband is delinquent on a post-petition DSO payment. The court examined the requirements for discharge using the plain language of § 1328(a).

In this case, the debtors, Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez, filed a joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy. At filing, neither owed a DSO. Approximately two years into their confirmed plan, Mr. Hernandez became liable for a DSO and subsequently fell behind in those payments. Both parties were aware of the DSO and neither reported the delinquency to their attorney nor the trustee.

After completion of the plan payments, Mrs. Hernandez moved for entry of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). The Trustee objected arguing Mrs. Hernandez was unjustly enriched and that failure to amend the plan demonstrates bad faith. No party disputed that all plan payments were made.

To read more and access the opinion click here