Property of Estate

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The 8th Circuit Rules That Post-Petition Pre-Conversion Increase In Equity in Real Estate Is Part of the Converted Chapter 7 Estate

The rise in equity in the appellant’s residence after filing for bankruptcy but before conversion became part of her bankruptcy estate after conversion, as outlined in 11 U.S.C.S § 348(f)(1)(A). This occurred because the residence was already part of the appellant’s estate, and she maintained possession and control over it at the time of filing for bankruptcy.

FACTS

“On August 19, 2020, Machele Goetz filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and plan. She owned a residence worth $130,000 and claimed a $15,000 homestead exemption under Missouri law. Freedom Mortgage held a $107,460.54 lien against the residence. It is undisputed that had the trustee liquidated the residence on the date of the petition, the estate would have received nothing net of the exemption, the lien, and the sale expenses.

“Later, on April 5, 2022, the bankruptcy court granted Goetz’s motion to convert her case from chapter 13 to chapter 7. Between the chapter 13 filing and the date of the conversion order, Goetz’s residence had increased in value by $75,000, and she had paid down a further $960.54 on the mortgage. Had the trustee liquidated the residence on the date of conversion, more than $62,000 net of the exemption, the lien, and the sale expenses would have been produced.

“After realizing that the trustee might sell the residence given the change in value, Goetz moved for the bankruptcy court to compel the trustee to abandon it. Goetz argued that the residence was of “inconsequential value and benefit to the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b), asserting that the post-petition, pre-conversion increase in equity must be excluded from the calculation of her residence’s value to the estate. The trustee resisted Goetz’s motion, arguing that, under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f), the bankruptcy estate in a converted case includes post-petition, pre-conversion increase in equity, meaning Goetz’s residence was still of value to the estate.”

ANALYSIS

Under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A),” the property of the estate in Goetz’s converted chapter 7 case consists of the property of the estate as of the date she filed her chapter 13 bankruptcy petition (August 19, 2020) that remained in her possession as of the date of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 (April 5, 2022). …

“Goetz’s residence is property of the converted estate because she held “legal or equitable interest[]” in it as of August 19, 2020, id. § 541(a)(1), and because it remained in her possession when she converted her case to chapter 7 on April 5, 2022, id. § 348(f)(1)(A). The question is whether the post-petition, pre-conversion increase in equity in that residence is also part of the converted estate. … We start with the first half of the definition of property of the converted estate: whether the property in question was “property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A). …

Property of the Estate

“Property of the estate at “[t]he commencement of a case” includes “[p]roceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.” Id. § 541(a)(6). A voluntary case in bankruptcy commences when the petition is filed. Id. § 301(a); see also id. § 348(a) (“Conversion of a case from a case under one chapter of this title to a case under another chapter of this title . . . does not effect a change in the date of the filing of the petition [or] the commencement of the case . . . .”).”

Proceeds

“But the Code does not define “proceeds” or “equity,” so “we may look to dictionaries . . . to determine the meaning.” Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 177 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2010); see also Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. at 126 (looking to Black’s Law Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary for the meaning of “define”). Proceeds are “[t]he value [*6] of land, goods, or investments when converted into money; the amount of money received from a sale.” Proceeds, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). HN6 Equity is “[t]he amount by which the value of or an interest in property exceeds secured claims or liens; the difference between the value of the property and all encumbrances on it.” Equity, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An encumbrance is “[a] claim or liability that is attached to property or some other right . . . that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage.” Encumbrance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

“The post-petition, pre-conversion increase in equity in Goetz’s residence—i.e. the difference between its value and the homestead exemption and lien—is therefore proceeds “from property of the estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (emphasis added), because it is the amount of money that the estate would receive from a sale of the residence before sale expenses. Cf. In re Potter, 228 B.R. 422, 424 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) (“Nothing in Section 541 suggests that the estate’s interest is anything less than the entire asset, including any changes in its value which might occur after the date of filing.”). Accordingly, the post-petition, pre-conversion increase in equity in Goetz’s residence was property [*7] of the estate at “[t]he commencement of [the] case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).”

NCBRC and NACBA submitted amicus briefs in support of the debtor both at the 8th Circuit and the 8th Circuit B.A.P.

In re Goetz

NCBRC-NACBA Amicus Brief – Goetz

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The Ninth Circuit Considers Whether Appellate Rights are Property of the Estate

In In re Lopez, Case No. 23-55682 (9th Cir. 2023), the Ninth Circuit is considering whether the bankruptcy court erred in (1) ruling that the Chapter 7 debtor’s right to appeal a prepetition personal injury judgment against her was property of the estate, (2) denying the debtor’s motion for the Chapter 7 trustee’s abandonment of the appeal rights, and (3) denying the debtor’s motion for reconsideration.

NCBRC filed an amicus brief requesting that the court narrowly confine its ruling to the specific facts of the case.  The concern is that a broad ruling will have a significant impact in other factual situations.

The fact that something has monetary value is not sufficient, by itself, to make it property of the estate. Just as no one would argue that a debtor’s kidneys should be property of the estate because they could have monetary value, it is not difficult to find many examples of situations in which classifying a right to appeal as property, simply because a trustee could sell it, would be extremely problematic. A debtor could be involved in a hotly-contested custody case, where a very questionable decision was appealed. The opposing party, perhaps far wealthier than the debtor, could offer to buy from the trustee the debtor’s right to appeal for more than the debtor could afford, thus ending the appeal. Similarly, a debtor could be involved in a contested divorce, in which a clearly erroneous support order for $100,000, which would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), was entered against the debtor. In that situation, too, the opposing party could offer the trustee $10,000 for the right to appeal, cutting off any review of the support order and leaving the debtor with a $100,000 debt after bankruptcy.

And such situations are not limited to family law matters. A debtor could be appealing an erroneous criminal conviction. The alleged crime victim, or even a prosecutor trying to save the costs of appeal, could purchase the debtor’s right to appeal from a bankruptcy trustee, perhaps causing the debtor to be imprisoned for years.  Or the debtor might be appealing an erroneous judgment or other decision that would lead to loss of a professional license, which would severely impair the debtor’s fresh start.

The loss of a debtor’s right to appeal could also lead to large debts becoming nondischargeable in bankruptcy when, in fact, they should be discharged. For example, a debtor could erroneously be found liable for a large amount in a fraud judgment that, if not reversed, would result in a nondischargeability determination under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991) (collateral estoppel applies in dischargeability determination). If the plaintiff could pay the bankruptcy trustee for the debtor’s right to appeal, and then dismiss the appeal, the debt would not be discharged.

In all these situations, and undoubtedly many others, the fact that a right may have monetary value to the bankruptcy estate, and could be sold by the trustee, should not, by itself, make that right property.

The amicus brief for NCBRC and NACBA is here:  Lopez amicus brief v4

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The 8th Circuit Considers Whether Post-Petition Equity Increases During a Chapter 13 Are Part of The Bankruptcy Estate in a Converted Chapter 7

UPDATE: This 8th Circuit has since issued a decision on this case. Click here to view our article discussing their ruling.

The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals is considering the issue whether the increased value of the debtor’s residence during a chapter 13 bankruptcy is part of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion.  This is an appeal from the 8th Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling that an increase in equity in real estate during a chapter 13 is part of the bankruptcy estate in a converted chapter 7 case.  Goetz v. Weber (In re Goetz), 651 B.R. 292 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2023).

The Debtor originally filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy. At filing the debtor there was no excess equity in her residence over her exemption and the mortgage. At confirmation property of the estate vested in the Debtor. Two years later Debtor converted her case to a chapter 7 bankruptcy. The value of her property appreciated during her chapter 13 so that approximately $62,000 could be liquidated by the trustee. The Debtor filed a motion to abandon property. The bankruptcy court denied the motion finding the increased equity part of the chapter 7 estate.

“Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines property of the bankruptcy estate to include all of a debtor’s interests both equitable and legal, except those specifically excluded. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Estate property includes “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case,” and “[a]ny interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) and (7).

“Upon conversion from one chapter to another, this definition is [*5] adjusted. Section 348 qualifies the scope of bankruptcy estate property by clarifying that “property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of conversion[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A). If a debtor converts a case under Chapter 13 to a case under another chapter, the property the debtor acquired between the petition date and the conversion date is not property of the converted case, unless the debtor sought to convert the case in bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2). …

“As the bankruptcy court observed, courts are split on the question of whether postpetition preconversion market appreciation or an increase in equity resulting from payments toward a lien inures to a debtor’s benefit upon conversion to a Chapter 7 case. …

“Goetz and the Amici Curiae insist that section 348(f) is ambiguous. They urge the Court to consider legislative history, which they maintain supports their argument that postpetition preconversion equity increases should benefit debtors. We detect no ambiguity in sections 348(f) and 541. Even if we were to conclude that section 348(f)(1)(A) is ambiguous, the legislative history of this statute does not mandate a different outcome.7 HN5 Section 348(f)(1)(A), as enacted, accomplished the purpose of the legislation as articulated in the legislative history: it eliminated a “serious disincentive to [C]hapter 13 filings” by adopting the reasoning of In re Bobroff and specifying that property a debtor acquires postpetition is not property of the converted bankruptcy estate. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 57 (1994), as reprinted in [*9] 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3366; see 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A); Bobroff v. Continental Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1985). Section 348(f) does not specify that debtors are entitled to retain equity resulting from payments during the Chapter 13 case—the scenario referenced in the House Report. Likewise, the statute does not address whether debtors are entitled to retain postpetition preconversion equity resulting from market appreciation, asset improvements or repairs. To accept Goetz’s argument, one must read this clarification into the statute.

“The plain meaning of a statute is conclusive, except in the “‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (Citations omitted.) …

“Congress’s failure to address the example included in the legislative history does not mean this omission was inadvertent. Recognizing that statutes are often the result of compromise, we decline to accept Goetz’s invitation to assume that Congress intended that debtors may retain postpetition preconversion market appreciation and equity resulting from debt payments without language articulating this intent.

“We also reject Goetz’s claim that interpreting section 348(f) to allow the bankruptcy estate to benefit from postpetition preconversion estate property value increases treats Goetz as though she converted her case in bad faith. To the extent Goetz acquired new property after she petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13, this property remains her property. In enacting section 348(f), Congress distinguished between property of the estate at the time of conversion that remains in the possession or control of the debtor from property acquired after petition. The former is property of the estate (Goetz’s residence), the latter is property of debtor unless she converted in bad faith. The bad faith provision neither hinders nor advances Goetz’s claim to the equity increase in her residence. It simply does not apply. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that postpetition preconversion nonexempt equity accrues for the benefit of the converted Chapter 7 estate.”

No date has yet been set for oral argument.

Appellant Goetz’ Brief

NCBRC-NACBA Amicus Brief – Goetz

Appellee Trustee Webers Appellee Brief

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“Equity Abhors a Forfeiture”

Where the debtor had paid over 70% of the purchase price of real property, the court found that equitable principles precluded granting relief from stay to allow the seller to enforce a provision in the sales documents requiring the defaulting debtor to “forfeit not only the property, but all deposits, improvements and payments made.” Allied Ventures, LLC. v. Cruz, No. 22-23864 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2023).The debtor entered into an agreement with Allied, titled Seller-Financed Industrial Purchase Agreement, to purchase property Allied had bought at a tax sale. As the “Buyer,” the debtor was able to take possession of the property and was obligated to pay $290,000 in accordance with a schedule of payments beginning with a $30,000 initial payment and $6,500 monthly payments once Allied obtain title. Once the purchase price was satisfied, Allied would transfer title to the Buyer. Allied exercised control over the property only to the extent that the agreement required the Buyer to use it for a purpose that was legal and that the Buyer provide insurance as specified by Allied.

The debtor also signed a promissory note as “Buyer/Borrower” obligating him to pay the entire purchase price of $290,000. Both the Purchase Agreement and the Promissory Note provided that, in the event of default, “[i]f the scheduled amount of payment is not made in sixty (60) days after the invoice date, you will forfeit not only the property, but all deposits, improvements and payments made.”

The debtor missed a payment and Allied sought to enforce the default provision. It obtained a state court judgment for possession in June 2022, and for reasons that weren’t explained, accepted a payment from the debtor in July, 2022. The debtor posted an $86,000 bond and appealed the state court judgment.

The debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy in September, 2022. In his 100% plan he proposed to treat the debt to Allied as a secured debt and pay the remaining balance through the plan.

The case came before the court on Allied’s motion for relief from stay to allow it to possess and sell the property with forfeiture by the debtor of all payments and improvements made. In its motion, Allied argued that the debtor’s plan incorrectly treated its claim as secured when in fact it was a lease agreement, and that the debtor had failed to propose a feasible plan.

In response, the debtor argued the Allied’s interest was protected by the $417,400 actual value of the property and the insurance he had obtained. His proposed plan included adequate protection payments of $1,800 per month. With respect to the nature of the agreement, the debtor took the position that if the court found it was not a secured loan but an executory contract, he would assume the lease, pay any arrearage through the plan and maintain monthly payments directly. The debtor further “propose[d] to use the $86,000.00 presently being held by the Shelby County Circuit Court Clerk to satisfy any such post-petition arrearage, and to otherwise be applied to the plan as may be determined by the Court.”

The court began its analysis with the nature of the underlying claim. It observed that the seller delivered possession of the property to the debtor and, with limited exceptions, the debtor undertook full responsibility for it. The promissory note created an absolute obligation on the debtor to pay $290,000, and title would transfer at the end of the payment period. The court found that “[a]lthough there is some ambiguity in the arrangement contemplated by the parties, the Court believes and finds for purposes of the pending Motion for Relief from Stay that the agreement between the parties is best characterized as an installment land sales contract.” It noted that, under Tennessee law, such contracts create a situation like a deed of trust where “the vendee is regarded as the owner, subject to liability for the unpaid price, and the vendor is regarded as holding only the legal title in trust for the vendee from the time a valid contract for the purchase of land is entered into.”

The court went on to determine whether the language of repossession and forfeiture in the agreement and the note justified granting Allied’s motion for relief from stay. For that analysis, the court looked to equitable principles. By the time the case came before the court, the debtor had paid 71-77% of the total purchase price. If Allied had its way, the debtor’s more than $200,000 in payments would be forfeit to Allied’s right to sell to another buyer.

This was unpalatable to the court. “Equity abhors a forfeiture.” The court observed that states often deny a vendor the right to sell against a defaulting buyer “when forfeiture would be unreasonable or inequitable.” The trend is to allow the buyer an opportunity to pay the remaining purchase price or the defaulted payments, in a redemption-type solution.

In light of the fact that the confirmation hearing was coming up, the court found no good reason to “short circuit that process.” It denied Allied’s motion for relief from stay.

Allied has appealed this decision to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit, case no. 23-8009.

Cruz Bankr WD Tenn Feb 2023

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Sixth Circuit Questions “Person-Aggrieved” Standard for Appeal

The debtors’ claim against lenders for charging improper fees during their bankruptcy belonged to the bankruptcy estate, but the lenders’ appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order of abandonment was dismissed because they lacked a direct financial stake in the outcome of the bankruptcy court’s decision and, therefore were not “persons-aggrieved.” In so holding, the Sixth Circuit indicated that had the lenders challenged the “person-aggrieved” standard it would likely have been found to have been abrogated by subsequent Supreme Court precedent and congressional action. Schubert v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. 21-3969 (6th Cir. March 28, 2023).

The debtors alleged that from 2000 to 2004, while they were in bankruptcy, Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Ocwen Financial Corporation (collectively, “the lenders”), breached their mortgage agreement by collecting fees to which they were not entitled. The debtors received their discharge in 2006 without having disclosed the claim against the lenders to the bankruptcy court, apparently due to the fact that they only discovered the overcharges a decade later during foreclosure proceedings. Upon discovery, the debtors sued the lenders in state court for breach of contract. The lenders argued that the claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The debtors had the state court case stayed and they reopened their bankruptcy case, seeking abandonment of the claim. The lenders opposed abandonment and countersued for an injunction to prevent the debtors from pursuing the state action. The debtors moved to dismiss the lenders’ complaint.

After a hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the debtor’s motion to dismiss and ruled that the claim belonged to the estate. It ordered the trustee to abandon the claim, and declined to issue an injunction. Upon appeals by both sides, the district court affirmed.

The case came before the Sixth Circuit on the lenders’ appeal of the abandonment order, and the debtors appeal of the denial of their motion to dismiss.

As an initial matter, the court found the lenders had standing to pursue the appeal. The prospect of state court litigation established the necessary “injury in fact fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely redressable by a favorable decision.”

Another jurisdictional question was more troublesome. The court found the lenders did not pass the “person-aggrieved” test, which bars appeals in bankruptcy by a party “who lack[s] a direct financial stake in the appeal’s outcome.” The person-aggrieved test was included in section 158 of the Bankruptcy Code until Congress removed it in the 1978 amendments to the Code.

The court indicated that the test, which has been deemed to be jurisdictional, is a likely candidate for abrogation in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125–27 (2014). Lexmarkprohibited a court from limiting its jurisdiction for prudential or policy reasons. “[W]hen Congress creates a right to sue consistent with the Constitution, a court may not take it away.”

However, the lenders did not seek abrogation of the test, so the court rendered its decision based on the test’s continued viability. It found that the lenders did not have the requisite financial stake in the appeal’s outcome because they sought only to preclude state court litigation. “[U]nder our precedent, staving off the threat of litigation doesn’t count. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 560 F.3d 449, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2009).”

The court turned next to the debtors’ appeal of the bankruptcy court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the lenders’ adversary complaint. The circuit court stated that the lenders had standing to bring the adversary complaint for the same reason they had standing to appeal. The court also rejected the debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to determine which claims belong in the estate, finding that that determination is well within the bankruptcy court’s administrative powers under section 157(b)(2)(A).

Finally, the court disagreed with the debtors’ contention that the lenders were not parties-in-interest. To the contrary, the lenders had “a practical stake in maintaining the settlement of claims the bankruptcy produced.” Had the claim against them been raised during the bankruptcy proceedings, they could have addressed it at that time.

The court dismissed the lenders’ appeal and affirmed the ruling that was the subject of the debtors’ appeal.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Moore stated that the person-aggrieved standard, rather than being at odds with more recent law, “reflects a zone-of-interests analysis that is consistent with Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).” Judge Moore observed that the person-aggrieved standard, while most often requiring a financial stake in the proceedings, may also be met when there is a public interest in the outcome of an appeal. In her opinion, when properly applied, the person-aggrieved standard “directs the courts to perform a zone-of-interests analysis in line with Lexmark.”

She agreed with the majority, however, that the lenders’ appeal did not fall under the zone-of-interests the abandonment statute, section 554, was intended to address. That provision was designed to prevent trustees from pursuing the sale of property only to increase the trustee’s commission without benefit to the estate. In this case, the lenders’ appeal was solely intended to free them from state court litigation and would not benefit the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the appeal was outside the zone-of-interest.

Schubert 6th Cir March 2023

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Ex-Wife’s Interest in Home Not Property of Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate

Under Colorado law,  spouses in dissolution proceedings own marital property as co-owners. Therefore the debtor’s ex-wife had a vested equitable interest in an up-front sum plus 50% of the proceeds from the sale of their marital residence as ordered by the divorce court, and that interest did not enter the debtor’s chapter 13 estate. Williams v. Goodman (In re Williams), No. 22-1067 (10th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (non-precedential).

The debtor and his wife, Ms. Williams, lived with their children in a home titled only in the debtor’s name. When they divorced, they agreed to sell the home. Ms. Williams was to receive $24,800 from the proceeds and the remaining proceeds were to be divided evenly between the two of them. Instead of selling the home, though, the debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy.

The debtor’s confirmed plan listed general unsecured creditors as “class four,” with their payments to be made on a pro rata basis after all prior classes of debts were fully paid. Beyond describing class four claims as allowed and timely filed, the plan did not address any individual unsecured claims.

Ms. Williams filed an adversary complaint seeking a ruling that her interest in the house did not become part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541(a), and seeking an order of nondischargeability of other claims under section 523(a). The debtor filed counterclaims including a request for attorney’s fees under section 523(d). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Ms. Williams on the section 541(a) claim and against her on the section 523 claims. The court ruled against the debtor on his counterclaims. It failed to address his claim under section 523.

The debtor moved for reconsideration based on the court’s failure to address the attorney’s fee claim, and at the same time, appealed the court’s decision in favor of Ms. Williams to the Tenth Circuit BAP. The bankruptcy court denied the motion for reconsideration, expressly rejecting his section 523 claim for attorney’s fees at that time. The debtor did not amend his BAP appeal to include the reconsideration order.

In the meantime, the trustee asked the court what she should do with the distributions earmarked for Ms. Williams. If Ms. William’s interest in the house was determined on appeal to be estate property she would be entitled to her pro rata share of the distributions representing only a fraction of the claim. But if it was outside the estate, she would be entitled to the entire amount as ordered by the divorce court. The bankruptcy court ordered the trustee to retain Ms. Williams’ share in a separate trust to await a ruling by the BAP as to the legal question. The debtor appealed that order to the BAP.

In two separate orders, the BAP affirmed the orders of the bankruptcy court. It did not consider the debtor’s arguments related to the bankruptcy court’s order denying reconsideration because the debtor failed to file a notice of appeal of that order.

The debtor appealed both decisions to the Tenth Circuit and that court consolidated the appeals.

The court began with the debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s distribution order contravened the terms of the confirmed plan. The court disagreed, finding that the provision in the plan and in the confirmation order concerning class four claims was general in its applicability. The court held that where neither the plan nor the confirmation order addressed the timing of distributions or whether specific claims like Ms. Williams’ were allowed, “the confirmation order did not have preclusive effect regarding the allowance of that claim or the timing of distributions based on that claim.” Therefore, the trustee was not required to adhere to the plan’s treatment of her claim in the event her interest in the house was determined not to be part of the bankruptcy estate. The court also rejected the debtor’s argument that the trustee’s motion for an order of distribution was actually merely an untimely appeal of the confirmation order.

The court next affirmed the BAP’s refusal to address the debtor’s motion for reconsideration. The court found that when a judgment or order under appeal is amended or added to while the appeal is pending, the appellant must file a new appeal or amend the pending appeal to encompass the new judgment or order. The debtor failed to do so.

The court then turned to the issue of whether Ms. Williams’ equitable interest in the house was not part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541. Section 541(d) states, “[p]roperty in which the debtor holds . . . only legal title and not an equitable interest, . . . becomes property of the estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.”

Looking to state law to determine the nature of Ms. Williams’ property interest, the court reasoned that at the time of the bankruptcy petition, Ms. Williams “had a vested interest in the house protected by ‘an encumbrance of record,’ created via ‘filing the lis pendens.’” Based on this finding, the circuit court agreed that Ms. Williams had an equitable interest in the property valued at 50% plus $24,800, that the debtor did not hold. Therefore, that interest did not become part of the debtor’s estate.

In answer to the debtor’s argument that Ms. Williams’ interest was not in the home itself, but in a sum of money representing a divorce settlement, the court turned again to state law. Colorado law states that upon filing a dissolution of marriage, marital property “the wife has an interest in the marital property in the nature of a co-owner, rather than as a mere creditor of her husband,” and that interest vests automatically.

The court concluded that Ms. Williams’ equitable interest in the property did not enter the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and affirmed the decisions of the BAP.

Williams 10th Cir Dec 2022

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No Harm in Failure to Disclose

The debtor was entitled to reopen her bankruptcy case to disclose a post-confirmation, pre-discharge lawsuit where she successfully completed her 100% plan so there was no harm to creditors by her failure to timely disclose the lawsuit, and the debtor would benefit from the opportunity to comply with Eleventh Circuit disclosure requirements. In re Calixto, No. 17-18317 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2023).

Approximately one year before the end of her chapter 13 plan, the debtor slipped and fell on property owned by Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc. One month after she successfully completed her plan and received her discharge, she sued Gulfstream in state court for negligence. Gulfstream moved for summary judgment arguing that the debtor was judicially estopped from pursuing the case because she failed to disclose the lawsuit to the bankruptcy court. The debtor moved to reopen her bankruptcy in order to disclose the claim.

The court began with sections 541 under which a lawsuit is property of a chapter 13 bankruptcy estate, and 1306(a)(1) which incorporates property acquired by the debtor post-confirmation into the bankruptcy estate. It noted that while the Code does not obligate debtors to make ongoing post-confirmation disclosures when they acquire new property, Eleventh Circuit precedent has established that debtors have a continuing duty to disclose a post-confirmation litigation claim.

Having found that the litigation was property of the estate and that the debtor had a duty to disclose it and failed to do so, the court went on to consider the equities of allowing her to reopen her bankruptcy to do so now. It weighed the benefits of reopening against prejudice to any of the parties.

While the court noted that it views nondisclosure with a jaundiced eye, in this case, the debtor’s schedules were accurate when she filed them and when her case was confirmed. Furthermore, all her creditors were paid the full amount of their claims so none were prejudiced by the debtor’s failure to disclose the lawsuit during her bankruptcy and none stood to benefit from the disclosure now. Nor was the trustee prejudiced by the failure to disclose because the debtor retained her right to personally pursue the litigation while her bankruptcy case was pending. Thus, “even if the Debtor had previously disclosed the litigation claim – or if the Court permits her to reopen her case now to disclose it – it would not have, and will not have, any effect on her bankruptcy estate or her creditors.”

On the other hand, by reopening, the debtor stood to benefit from the opportunity to satisfy the procedural technicality established by the Eleventh Circuit and pursue her rights against Gulfstream in state court.

The court found that requiring Gulfstream to address the merits of the debtor’s case in state court did not constitute prejudice.

The court granted the debtor’s motion to reopen.

Calixto Bankr SD Fla Jan 2023

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Stevens v. Whitmore, No. 20-60044 (9th Cir.)

Type: Amicus
Date: February 26, 2021
Description: Whether chapter 7 trustee abandons cause of action asset under section 554(c) when the cause of action is fully disclosed and he determines that it lacks value to the estate, but the debtors listed the asset in their SOFA rather than in their schedules.
Result: Judgment affirmed, Oct. 19, 2021.

Stevens Decision (9th) Oct 2021

Stevens 9th Cir Amicus Feb 2021

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City of Chicago v. Moore, Nos. 17-3663, 17-3664 (7th Cir.)

Type: Amicus
Date: May 21, 2018
Description: Whether court may confirm plan in which property does not re-vest in debtor.  Whether the bankruptcy court erred, in multiple cases, in denying the city’s motion for allowance and payment of administrative expense claim based on traffic tickets issued after debtor’s Chapter 13 petition was filed.
Result: Pending

MooreHernandez NACBA amicus 7th Cir May 2018