National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center
Protecting The Rights Of Consumer Debtors In Bankruptcy
The Ninth Circuit BAP found that a chapter 13 plan could not be determined to be in bad faith solely on the basis of debtors’ deduction of payments made on secured debts, without regard to “necessity” of those debts, and their exclusion of social security income from their calculation of disposable income. Drummond v. Welsh (In re Welsh), No. 10-1465 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2012).
Welsh judgment [Read more…] about Bad Faith Cannot Be Based on Income Determined in Compliance with Code
In an opinion that strains to uphold the conclusion that the “core purpose” of BACPA is to “maximize[e] creditor’s recover[y],” the Sixth Circuit has held that “post-petition income that becomes available to debtors after their 401(k) loans are fully repaid is ‘projected disposable income’ that must be turned over to the trustee for distribution to unsecured creditors pursuant to § 1325(b)(1)(B) and may not be used to fund voluntary 401(k) plans.” Seafort v. Burden, No. 10-6248 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2012). The debtor appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in debtor’s favor.
Seafort Opinion [Read more…] about Post-Petition Funds from 401(k) Loan Payoff May Not Be Voluntarily Contributed to Retirement Fund
News of a settlement between forty nine state attorneys general (Oklahoma did not join the settlement), the federal government, and five leading mortgage lenders, was released on Thursday, February 9. The settlement purports to resolve the investigation of lenders for the pervasive practice of “robo-signing” foreclosure-related documents. The deal, which will not be final until it receives court approval, promises approximately $25 billion in relief for distressed borrowers as well as funds to state and federal governments. The agreement is expected to benefit millions of homeowners by reduction of loan principal for delinquent borrowers, or refinancing of loans to non-delinquent borrowers whose homes are underwater. The agreement also provides for compensation to victims of foreclosure abuses. The settling banks include; Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. Although the final agreement is not yet available, a summary of its contents can be found at http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/states [Read more…] about Mortgage Plan Settlement Agreement
Last week, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Deutsche Bank (DB) had not proved its status as a “party in interest” in a motion for relief from stay due to its failure to produce evidence of possession of the promissory note. In re Miller, No. 11-1232 (10th Cir., Feb. 1, 2012). The Millers filed a chapter 13 petition to prevent foreclosure sale of their home after the Colorado state court had granted an “Order Authorizing Sale” (OAS) under Civil Rule 120. In its motion for relief from stay DB presented only a copy of the Note indorsed in blank The bankruptcy court granted relief from stay based on the evidentiary showing, and the BAP affirmed on the basis of the state court’s OAS and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. [Read more…] about Tenth Circuit Requires Proof of Possession of Note Indorsed in Blank
The Fourth Circuit recently found that class proofs of claim are permissible subject to certification under Bankruptcy Rule 7023 (incorporating Civil Rule 23) and Rule 9014. Gentry v. Seigel, No. 10-2418 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2012). NACBA and NACA filed an amicus brief seeking reversal of the bankruptcy court’s decision that the bankruptcy process is always superior to class actions. The Fourth Circuit agreed. It held that certification of a creditor class is fact specific issue to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court further held that a motion for class certification need not be filed before the expiration of the claims bar date. While the court ultimately affirmed the denial of class certification, it made clear that its decision was based on the specific facts of the case rather than on a bright line rule disfavoring class proofs of claim.
Gentry 4th Cir opinion
NCBRC Project Director, Tara Twomey, and co-author, Prof. Katie Porter, have written a chapter in the newly released book Shared Responsibility, Shared Risk: Government, Markets and Social Policy in the Twenty-First Century (Jacob S. Hacker and Ann O’Leary eds., Oxford University Press 2012). The chapter, “Risk Allocation in Home Ownership,” focuses on how changes in mortgage contract terms increased home ownership risks for families. After discussing how recent decades of mortgage product innovation both increased the risk of home ownership and shifted more of that risk to borrowers, the chapter offers three core principles to guide the future regulation of mortgages. “First government should collect comprehensive reliable data on mortgage products and should monitor the way in which those products allocate the risks between borrowers and lenders. Second, any effort to rebalance the risks inherent in the mortgage process must consider consumers’ limited abilities to evaluate complex financial products. Third, any successful regulation of mortgage products requires the development and deployment of effective enforcement tools for consumer protection laws.”
Two weeks ago the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals side-stepped the issue of whether a chapter 13 debtor has standing under section 544 to avoid a pre-petition transfer. In re Lee, 2012 WL 29185, No. 10-1772 (Jan. 6, 2012) (per curiam). The bankruptcy court had previously ruled against the debtor on the standing issue and the district court affirmed. In the case, involving a family dispute over real property, the Fourth Circuit held that the debtor was collaterally estopped from asserting the existence of an avoidable transfer or interest in the property on the date of filing.
Whether a debtor has standing to exercise section 544 avoidance powers has long been a contentious issue that has divided bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy appellate panels. Most recently, in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Barbee, No. 10-8074 (B.A.P. 6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2011), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit concluded that a debtor had derivative standing to seek avoidance of an unperfected lien on his manufactured home under section 544. The court identified certain economic realities that supported its finding: the trustee’s lack of resources to pursue every legitimate avoidance claim, the requirement that the plan conform to section 1325(a)(4), and the possibility of the debtor’s being accused of bad faith if he proposes a plan that does include avoidance of a clearly avoidable lien. (U.S. Bank filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on Jan. 10, 2012.)
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently held Deutsche Bank’s feet to the fire when the debtor challenged Deutsche Bank’s (DB) standing to bring a foreclosure action against him. Deutsche Bank v. Brumbaugh, No. 109223 (January 17, 2012). DB attached the note, mortgage, and loan modification papers to its foreclosure petition but Mr. Brumbaugh denied that the papers were the ones he had signed. He argued that DB had not proved that it was the proper party to bring a foreclosure action. DB filed for summary judgment supported by an affidavit by the servicer averring that DB was the current holder of the note and mortgage. However, the affidavit failed to state when DB became the holder. In its response to debtor’s brief DB attached a copy of the note with an undated indorsement to DB. The trial court granted summary judgment and the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that “It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit.” Because the indorsed note finally presented to the court was undated, there was insufficient proof that DB was the holder at the time the foreclosure petition was filed. See also Patterson v. GMAC Mortgage, No. 2100490 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App., Jan. 20, 2012) (mortgage assigned to GMAC after it initiated foreclosure proceedings therefore GMAC lacked standing for ejectment action).
Today the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Baud v. Carroll, which raised the issue of the appropriate applicable commitment period for an above-median income debtor with no “projected disposable income.” The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held below that above-median income debtors with no projected disposable income must propose five year plans if the trustee or unsecured creditor objects to a shorter plan period. See 634 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2011). Attention will now turn to Flores v. Danielson, No. 11-55452 (9th Cir.), where the Ninth Circuit will consider whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct.2464 (2010), abrogated the Ninth’s Circuit prior ruling on the applicable commitment period in Kagenveama v. Maney, 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008).
The fallout from Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) is really picking up. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit court to weigh in, ruling, in a case with facts similar to those of Stern, that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to issue a final judgment on a claim, asserted by debtors in two proposed class actions, that a medical services creditor violated a Wisconsin state statute by filing proofs of claim revealing the debtors’ medical information. In re Ortiz, — F.3d —-, 2011 WL 6880651 (7th Cir., Dec 30, 2011). Courts disagree over whether a bankruptcy court may issue a final judgment in a proceeding to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer. Compare In re Citron, 2011 WL 4711942 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y., Oct. 6, 2011) (court may issue final judgment), with In re Heller Ehrman LLP, — F.Supp.2d —-, 2011 WL 6179149 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 13, 2011) (court may not issue final judgment). A question several courts have asked is what a bankruptcy court should do when a matter designated as “core” in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) is one that must be decided by an Article III court. The two possibilities are that “unconstitutional core” matters default to the procedure used for non-core matters, (i.e., proposed findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)) or, alternatively, that such matters should be entirely removed from the bankruptcy courts. Most courts considering the issue hold that bankruptcy courts retain the power to enter proposed findings and recommendations in this class of cases. See, e.g., In re Byce, 2011 WL 6210938 (D. Idaho, Dec. 14, 2011); In re Mortgage Store, Inc., 2011 WL 5056990 (D. Hawai’i, Oct. 5, 2011); In re Heller Ehrman LLP, above.