In a departure from the majority of courts, the Seventh Circuit has found that debtors cannot exempt inherited IRAs. In re Clark, No. 12-1241 & 12-1255 (April 23, 2013). [Read more…] about Seventh Circuit Deals a Blow to Debtors Who Inherit IRAs
Acceleration Clause Clears Way for Modification
A bankruptcy court in Maryland found that an acceleration clause in a deed of trust making the remaining debt immediately due, triggered the modification clause of section 1322(c)(2). Fed’l Nat’l Mtg. Ass’n v. Griffin (In re Griffin), No. 12-19863 (March 18, 2013). [Read more…] about Acceleration Clause Clears Way for Modification
Some Hope for Student Loan Debtors
Two recent student loan cases shine a ray of hope for debtors crushed by education-based debts. See Kreiger v. ECMC, No. 12-3592 (7th Cir. Apr. 10, 2013) and Roth v. ECMC, No. 11-1233 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2013). [Read more…] about Some Hope for Student Loan Debtors
Petition for Certiorari on Stern Issues Addresses “Gap” in Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Two issues growing out of the Supreme Court’s controversial jurisdictional decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), have found their way back to that Court in a petition for certiorari. Executive Benefits Insurance Agency (EBIA) v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency), No. 12A831 (S.Ct. Apr. 3, 2013). The case involves an alleged fraudulent conveyance by a non-creditor and is squarely within the holding of Stern under which the Court found that Congress violated Article III when it vested in bankruptcy courts the authority to enter final judgments on certain state-law counterclaims designated as “core” bankruptcy proceedings under Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28.
The issues raised in the petition are: 1) whether the bankruptcy court had the power under 28 U.S.C. 157(b) to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for final adjudication, and 2) whether, the bankruptcy court could finally adjudicate a motion for summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim upon consent of the parties.
While the case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Based on that case, the circuit court found that although the Constitution precluded a bankruptcy court from finally deciding the core issue of fraudulent conveyance involving a non-creditor, 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1) should be interpreted to permit bankruptcy courts all the power that “the constitution will bear” and that the “more modest power” to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is within those confines. Additionally, citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986), the court distinguished between personal and structural protections under Article III finding that the issue of fraudulent conveyance implicated personal protections that could be waived by the parties. Where section 157(c) permits the parties to consent to final adjudication in non-core proceedings, the court found that it followed that they could likewise consent to such adjudication in core proceedings. Exec. Ben. Ins. Agency v. Arkinson, 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012)
The petition identifies a split in the circuit courts with respect to both of these issues. In Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 917–918 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2333 (Mar. 18, 2013), the Sixth Circuit held that parties cannot consent to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate core issues on a private right of action subject to Article III, and in Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011), the Seventh Circuit held that proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were limited to non-core proceedings.
The case, if accepted by the Supreme Court, could guide the courts in dealing with the “gap” left by the decision in Stern.
Debtor Has Standing to Argue Failure to Comply with Terms of PSA
A Michigan state court found that a debtor may oppose foreclosure on the basis that the assignment of the mortgage to the foreclosing party was in violation of the Pooling and Service Agreement and, therefore, ineffective. HSBC Bank, USA v. Young, No. 11-693 (Cir. Ct. Mich. Oct. 16, 2012). HSBC conducted a foreclosure by advertisement and bought the property at the foreclosure sale. When it moved the court for possession of the property the debtor challenged the legitimacy of the foreclosure on the basis that the assignment of the note and mortgage from Wells Fargo to HSBC took place after the note was in default in violation of the terms of the PSA. [Read more…] about Debtor Has Standing to Argue Failure to Comply with Terms of PSA
NACBA Argues that Possession Necessary for Turnover Obligation
NACBA has filed an amicus brief in the case of In re Henson, No. 11-16019 (9th Cir.), seeking a finding by the Ninth Circuit that the trustee may not use his turnover power under section 542 to require a debtor to pay into the estate funds that are no longer in the debtor’s possession. In this case, the debtor had written a check prior to bankruptcy which was not cashed until after the bankruptcy filing. Instead of using his avoidance power under section 549 to recover the funds from the payee, the trustee sought to obtain the money from the debtor, thereby exposing the debtor to double payment and allowing the payee to receive more than he would have been entitled to through bankruptcy distribution. [Read more…] about NACBA Argues that Possession Necessary for Turnover Obligation
NACBA Files Amicus in Bifurcated Lien Treatment in Chapter 13
NACBA has filed an amicus brief in the case of In re Bullard, No. 12-54 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.). That case involves a chapter 13 plan under which a mortgage is bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions with the unsecured portion being paid, pro rata, through the plan, and the secured portion being paid according to the terms of the contract outside the plan and extending beyond the plan period. The trustee objected to the plan arguing that if modification is permitted under section 1322(b), the payments on the mortgage must be completed within the plan period. In its brief, NACBA argues that the plain language of section 1322 permits such lien treatment. Specifically, “[a]ll section 1322(b)(5) requires is that the debtor cure any arrearage and make payments on the creditor’s secured claim according to the contract during the life of the plan. Section 1322(b)(2) is permissive allowing debtors to modify certain claims. Section 1322(d) limits the life of the plan to five years. These sections do not require the debtor to pay the claim in full while the case is pending, nor do they preclude the debtor from making payments on the long-term obligation after the plan has been completed.”
David Barnes drafted NACBA’s brief.
Attorney/Client Privilege Protects Intake Questionnaire
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a memorandum “in order to clarify the scope of the attorney/client privilege and the work product doctrine” in the bankruptcy context. In re McDowell, No. 12-31231 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2012). There, the UST sought to compel production of three documents: 1) the attorney’s intake questionnaire, 2) a copy of the original draft Schedule F with debtors’ handwritten notes on it, 3) debtors’ counsel’s draft copy of the Schedule F with his handwritten notes on it. The debtors asserted attorney/client privilege and work product with respect to the questionnaire, attorney/client privilege with respect to the debtors’ draft of the Schedule F form, and work product with respect to the attorney’s draft of the Schedule F form.
[Read more…] about Attorney/Client Privilege Protects Intake Questionnaire
Sanctions for Willful Violation of the Automatic Stay
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois took decisive action to sanction an internationally active telecommunications company, Owtel Inc., for persistent violations of the automatic stay under section 362(a)(6). In re Galutan, No. 12-31837 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2012). The court found that Owtel was informed of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing on August 12, 2012, but continued to dun her for payments of the $74.00 debt with repeated letters and telephone calls to her home phone and cell phone as often as twice a day. Finding that the conduct was willful the court turned to the appropriate damage award under section 362(k). Although the Seventh Circuit does not permit monetary awards for emotional distress the court found actual damages in the amount of $2,940.00 for attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing the stay violation. In addition, the court found that the egregious nature of Owtel’s relentless pursuit warranted a punitive damage award of $15,000.00. The court ended with the warning that if the violations continue, it would consider further sanctions in the amount of $500.00 per day.
Court Orders Quitclaim of Surrendered Property
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found a unique way to deal with the problem of surrendered property that the mortgagee refused to foreclose upon. It authorized the debtor to convey the property via quitclaim deed to the mortgagee upon continued failure to accept title. In re Perry, No. 12-1633, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4731 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Oct. 9, 2012). [Read more…] about Court Orders Quitclaim of Surrendered Property