National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center

Protecting The Rights Of Consumer Debtors In Bankruptcy

automatic stay

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Tribe Has Sovereign Immunity from Stay Violation Suit

Payday lenders belonging to a Native American Tribe enjoy sovereign immunity from suit under section 362 for violation of the automatic stay. In re Coughlin, No. 19-14142 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2020).

The chapter 13 debtor filed a motion seeking a finding that a group of payday lenders violated the automatic stay when they continued to dun him for payments after he filed his bankruptcy petition. The creditors, all members of a Native American Tribe, moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they were entitled to sovereign immunity for their conduct. [Read more…] about Tribe Has Sovereign Immunity from Stay Violation Suit

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SCOTUS Finds Retention of Property Is Not Exercise of Control

In an unhappy start to the new year, the Supreme Court resolved a long-festering issue in favor of creditors when it found that “mere retention of property does not violate §362(a)(3).” City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. ___, No. 19-357 (S.Ct. Jan. 14, 2021).

Here, a number of chapter 13 debtors entered bankruptcy after the City of Chicago impounded their vehicles for failure to pay traffic fines. In their separate cases, the debtors sought return of the vehicles arguing that once they filed for bankruptcy, the City’s retention of the vehicles violated the automatic stay. The bankruptcy courts in each case agreed with the debtors. In a consolidated opinion, the Seventh Circuit found that retention of the vehicles constituted an exercise of control over property of the estate within the meaning of section 362(a)(3). It affirmed. In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019). [Read more…] about SCOTUS Finds Retention of Property Is Not Exercise of Control

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Sixth Circuit Discusses Appellate Jurisdiction

Where the BAP remanded to the bankruptcy court for a finding on whether the creditor violated the automatic stay by failing to prevent the continuation of a contempt hearing against the debtor, the Sixth Circuit relied on precedent to conclude that the BAP’s order was not final and appealable. Wohleber v. Skurko (In re Wohleber), No. 19-3223/3225 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2020) (unpublished). In her concurring opinion, Judge Batchelder argued that the precedent relied on by the majority was erroneous and advocated for adopting a rule that “we have appellate jurisdiction if either the bankruptcy court’s judgment or the intermediate appellate judgment is final.” [Read more…] about Sixth Circuit Discusses Appellate Jurisdiction

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Lifting the Stay only for Debtor in Serial Filings

Where a debtor makes serial filings for bankruptcy, the automatic stay is lifted after 30 days only with respect to the debtor and not with respect to property of the estate. Rose v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 19-50598 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2019).

Five years after the debtor and her then husband bought their residence, they divorced and the debtor’s husband retained the house on the condition that, if he defaulted on the mortgage, he would transfer ownership to the debtor. He defaulted. Although the house did not actually transfer to the debtor until five years after the last payment on the mortgage, the debtor became actively involved in battle with the mortgage creditor. On four occasions, the creditor set a foreclosure date and the debtor filed for bankruptcy to forestall the sale of the property. The bankruptcy cases were pending for a total of 269 days. [Read more…] about Lifting the Stay only for Debtor in Serial Filings

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$67,000 in Fees and Costs Reasonable for Stay Litigation

The debtors’ attorney was entitled to approximately $67,000.00 in attorney’s fees and expert witness fees and costs for his representation of the debtors in their action against the creditor for violation of the automatic stay. In re Moon, No. 13-12466 (Bankr. D. Nev. May 29, 2020).

After they had obtained their discharge, the debtors reopened their bankruptcy with new counsel, Christopher Burke, in order to file a motion to hold Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, in contempt for violation of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction. After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court found Rushmore in violation of the automatic stay, but because the date Rushmore learned of the discharge was not established, the court did not find it in violation of the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court awarded the debtors over $100,000 in actual damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs under section 362(k)(1).

Mr. Burke then submitted his fee application seeking $56,150 in fees based on 112.3 hours of work at $500.00/hour, $1,950.30 in costs, and $8,907.64 in witness fees for the expert testimony of John Rao. He further sought an order enhancing his fees by a multiplier of 1.5. Rushmore objected to the fee application generally, arguing that because he did not have a written fee agreement with the debtors, Mr. Burke did not comply with ethics requirements. Rushmore further argued that Mr. Burke’s hourly rate and the expert witness fee were excessive. Finally, Rushmore argued that Mr. Burke was not entitled to a fee enhancement. [Read more…] about $67,000 in Fees and Costs Reasonable for Stay Litigation

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Creditor Had Affirmative Duty to Stop State Contempt Action

“A creditor, who has put a collection effort into motion must affirmatively act to stop, stay, or hold the collection effort in abeyance or risk incurring liability once a bankruptcy commences.” Valentine v. Valentine, No. 19-40593, Adv. Proc. No. 19-4022 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2020).

Before he filed for chapter 7 relief, the debtor and the creditor were divorced. The divorce agreement obligated the debtor pay his ex-spouse domestic support. At some point after their divorce the debtor fell behind on his payments and sought to modify the support agreement. His efforts were unsuccessful and, in a state court contempt action, he was ordered to sell his residence to pay the domestic support debt. He failed to do so and continued to reside in the property. He filed for bankruptcy on February 1, 2019. Within days of filing his petition, on February 4, 2019, the state court held a second hearing for contempt due to his failure to sell his residence. Though his ex-spouse’s divorce counsel knew of the bankruptcy filing, he did not attempt to stop the contempt hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the state court found the debtor had filed for bankruptcy in order to remove the residence from the grasp of the creditor. The court issued an Order & Confinement holding in part: “[Debtor] to remain confined until he pays the sums due and owing in principal sum of $64,003.73 as of 1-22-18 or otherwise purges himself of contempt.” Pursuant to this order, the debtor was jailed for four days. On appeal, the state appellate court vacated the Order & Confinement finding that the debtor had no avenue for purging the contempt. [Read more…] about Creditor Had Affirmative Duty to Stop State Contempt Action

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First Circuit BAP Applies “Gavel Rule” to Foreclosure Sale

A panel for the First Circuit BAP found that the debtor could not cure and maintain her mortgage in bankruptcy because she had no interest in the property which was sold in a foreclosure sale prior to her bankruptcy petition, despite the fact that the mortgagee failed to record the deed of sale in accordance with state foreclosure law. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Vertullo, Nos. 18-56, 18-63 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Jan. 10, 2020).

After the debtor defaulted on her mortgage, the mortgagee, U.S. Bank, sold the property to a third party through a foreclosure sale. The foreclosure deed was not recorded. When Ms. Vertullo filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy, the Bank sought to lift the automatic stay in order to evict Ms. Vertullo from the property. Ms. Vertullo countered that, because the foreclosure sale was not recorded within the time required by state law, she retained an interest in the property and could cure and maintain the mortgage through her plan. The bankruptcy court agreed. It denied the Bank’s motion for relief from stay and, in a separate order, confirmed the debtor’s plan. In re Vertullo, 593 B.R. 92, 94 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2018). The Bank appealed both orders to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit. [Read more…] about First Circuit BAP Applies “Gavel Rule” to Foreclosure Sale

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Denial of Motion for Relief from Stay is Final and Appealable

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for relief from stay constitutes a final, appealable order under section 158(c)(2). Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, No. 18-938, 589 U.S. ___ (2020). NACBA filed an amicus brief in support of the Respondent.

Ritzen Group and Jackson Masonry entered into a land-sales contract. The deal fell through and Ritzen filed suit against Jackson in Tennessee state court for breach of contract. On the eve of trial, Jackson filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Ritzen sought relief from stay to allow the state civil trial to go forward. The court denied the motion, and Ritzen did not appeal. After a hearing in which it found Ritzen at fault for the failure of the contract, the bankruptcy court also disallowed Ritzen’s claim against the bankruptcy estate. Ritzen then appealed to the district court challenging both the denial of the motion for relief from stay and the ruling on the contract dispute. The district court found the relief from stay appeal was untimely, and ruled against Ritzen on the merits of the contract appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In re Jackson Masonry, LLC, 906 F. 3d 494 (2018). [Read more…] about Denial of Motion for Relief from Stay is Final and Appealable

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No Stay Violation When Creditor Retains Vehicle Repossessed Pre-Petition

The Third Circuit joined the Tenth and D.C Circuits to hold that, “upon notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy, a secured creditor’s failure to return collateral that was repossessed pre-bankruptcy petition is [not] a violation of the automatic stay,” because it is not an act “to exercise control over property of the estate.” In re Denby-Peterson, No. 18-3562 (3rd Cir. Oct. 28, 2019).

After Joy Denby-Peterson paid $9,200 over approximately eighteen months toward her used Chevy Corvette, the holder of the loan repossessed the vehicle due to her failure to pay the $2,491 down payment that the purchase agreement required. Ms. Denby-Peterson filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. She notified the creditor of the petition and demanded the return of the vehicle. When the creditor failed to return the vehicle, the bankruptcy court granted Ms. Denby-Peterson’s motion for turnover under section 542(a), but, finding that the creditor’s retention of the vehicle did not violate the automatic stay, denied her demand for sanctions. The district court affirmed. [Read more…] about No Stay Violation When Creditor Retains Vehicle Repossessed Pre-Petition

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Scotus Offered Another Opportunity to Address Passive Conduct and the Automatic Stay

After recently declining cert in a case involving the issue of whether a creditor’s passive conduct can ever violate the automatic stay (Davis v. Tyson Prepared Foods, No. 18-941 (10th Cir. cert. denied, May 20, 2019) (blogged here)), the Supreme Court has been presented with another opportunity to take on the issue. In In re Fulton, Nos. 18-2527, 18-2793, 18-2835, 18-3023, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 18393 (7th Cir. June 19, 2019), (blogged here), the City of Chicago impounded the debtors’ vehicles prior to their filing for chapter 13 bankruptcy. Upon filing for bankruptcy, the debtors sought to have the vehicles returned. The City refused, and the bankruptcy court found its refusal constituted a violation of the automatic stay. The City appealed.

Citing its decision in Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that passively retaining, and refusing to return, estate property is an exercise of control within the meaning of section 362(a)(3). The court found that section 542(a) also mandates that an entity in possession of estate property turn it over to the trustee. The court rejected the City’s call to overturn Thompson, recognizing that one of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy is to allow a debtor to improve her financial situation, and that a vehicle is frequently necessary to achieve that goal.

The City’s petition for certiorari, points out that five courts of appeals (the second, seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh), have likewise found that passive conduct can be the basis for an automatic stay violation, while two courts of appeals (the tenth and the District of Columbia) have adopted the position that a creditor’s conduct must be affirmative.

City of Chicago v. Fulton Cert Petition