National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center

Protecting The Rights Of Consumer Debtors In Bankruptcy

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No Amortization of Tax Refund in W.D. Texas

In an opinion that reads like a father chastising his ungrateful children, the District Court for the Western District of Texas scolded the debtors for their proposed treatment of anticipated tax refunds and required them to adhere to the District Plan under which they could retain up to $2,000 of their refunds, but must turn over to the Trustee any amount remaining as disposable income. Vega v. Viegelahn, No. 18-796 and Diaz v. Viegelahn, No. 18-798 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019) (consolidated for argument and decision).

Contrary to the District Plan structure, the debtors in this case sought to amortize their tax refunds as income over one year. Upon objection by the trustee, the debtors ultimately amended their plans to conform to the District Plan. They then appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order of confirmation arguing that the District Plan’s treatment of the tax refunds violated various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Local Rules and the Official Forms. [Read more…] about No Amortization of Tax Refund in W.D. Texas

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Federal Homestead Exemption Applies to Property Debtor’s Dependent Lives on Part-Time

The creditor’s judgment lien impaired the debtor’s federal homestead exemption even though she did not reside on the property, where her dependent son lived on the property part-time with the debtor’s ex-husband. Donovan v. Maresca, No. 18-1146 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2019).

When Melissa Maresca filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, her divorce attorney held a judgment lien against real property Ms. Maresca owned with her ex-husband. Although Ms. Maresca did not use the property as her residence, her ex-husband resided there and her dependent son used the home as his part-time residence. In her bankruptcy, Ms. Maresca elected to use the federal exemptions and she sought to avoid the lien as impairing her federal homestead exemption under section 522(f). The creditor objected arguing that because Ms. Maresca did not reside on the property, she was not entitled to use the homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court granted Ms. Maresca’s motion to avoid the lien. [Read more…] about Federal Homestead Exemption Applies to Property Debtor’s Dependent Lives on Part-Time

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No Sovereign Immunity in Strip of State Tax Lien

An action to strip off a wholly unsecured State tax lien is an in rem proceeding that does not implicate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Berger, No. 19-417 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2019).

The debtors entered Chapter 13 bankruptcy with outstanding State tax liens on their real property. Because the property was subject to mortgage liens amounting to more than its value, the debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking to strip off the State’s tax lien as wholly unsecured. The bankruptcy court rejected the State’s Eleventh Amendment argument and denied its motion to dismiss. The State immediately appealed the denial to the district court as authorized by Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993). [Read more…] about No Sovereign Immunity in Strip of State Tax Lien

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Court Has Discretion to Deny Arbitration in Discharge Injunction Case

The Fifth Circuit found that the test it established in In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1059, 1069 (5th Cir. 1997), was still good law notwithstanding the intervening case of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and that, under National Gypsum, the bankruptcy properly exercised its discretion to deny the creditor’s motion to compel arbitration in an action alleging discharge injunction violation. Henry v. Educ. Fin. Serv., No 18-20809 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2019).

NCBRC, NACBA and Professor Jay Westbrook provided an amicus brief, authored by NACBA member Allan Gropper, in support of the debtor in this case.

Stephanie Henry filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy ten years after entering into a student loan contract with Wells Fargo’s predecessor. After she successfully completed her five-year plan, Wells Fargo sent her a letter containing language to the effect that it was attempting to collect the remaining debt on the loan. Ms. Henry filed an adversary proceeding alleging violation of the discharge injunction. Wells Fargo moved to compel arbitration in accordance with a clause in the lending agreement under which Ms. Henry agreed to have any complaint “arising under or relating to” the debt settled by arbitration. The bankruptcy court denied Wells Fargo’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis that the cause of action did not arise under or relate to the student loan contract. The court certified the case for interlocutory appeal directly to the Fifth Circuit. [Read more…] about Court Has Discretion to Deny Arbitration in Discharge Injunction Case

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Arbitration Clause Does Not Constrain Court’s Contempt Power

Finding that “[w]ords in a consumer agreement cannot deprive the bankruptcy court of the inherent power to enforce compliance with an injunction,” the district court found an arbitration clause in a consumer contract did not constrain the court’s contempt powers. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, LP v. Bateman, No. 14-5369, Adv. Proc. No. 18-1394 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2019).

Christopher Bateman filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy listing Verizon as an unsecured creditor. Verizon did not acknowledge or take part in the bankruptcy in any way. Five months after Mr. Bateman obtained his discharge, Verizon sent him a letter attempting to collect the discharged debt. Mr. Bateman moved the court to hold Verizon in contempt for violation of the discharge injunction. In response, Verizon moved to compel arbitration, invoking its Customer Agreement with Mr. Bateman which provided that any dispute which “in any way relates to or arises out of” the agreement is subject to arbitration. The bankruptcy court found that its power to enforce its order was not subject to the terms of Mr. Bateman’s Customer Agreement with Verizon. [Read more…] about Arbitration Clause Does Not Constrain Court’s Contempt Power

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Bankruptcy Court Gets Undue Hardship Right on Remand

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test to find that the Chapter 7 debtor was entitled to have her student loans discharged in bankruptcy notwithstanding the fact that she had substantial exempt equity in her home. Schatz v. U.S. Dept. of Ed., No. 14-30825, Adv. Proc. No. 15-3001 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2019).

When the debtor, Audrey Schatz, was in her fifties she attempted to improve her earning potential by attending law school, for which she incurred $106,000 in student loans. After becoming a lawyer, however, she was unable to find satisfactory employment and was earning approximately $25,000 when she filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected her position that the student loan debt caused her undue hardship and found that the loans were nondischargeable under section 523(a)(8). [Read more…] about Bankruptcy Court Gets Undue Hardship Right on Remand

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Property Purchased in Tax Sale for Less than Its Value Is Preferential Transfer

The Third Circuit affirmed that because New Jersey’s tax foreclosure sales are not tied to the value of the property, the transfer of property worth more than what the purchaser would have received in a Chapter 7 distribution may be avoided as a preferential transfer. Hackler v. Arianna Holdings Company, LLC., No. 18-1650 (3rd Cir. Sept. 12, 2019). NCBRC filed an amicus brief in support of the debtors.

Frank and Dawn Hackler failed to pay taxes on their residence. The property was sold in a tax sale according to New Jersey tax foreclosure procedures under which the public bids only on the interest rate for the unpaid taxes with the property going to the lowest bidder. A tax purchaser won the bid, and then sold the property, valued at $335,000, to Arianna Holding Co. LLC. for $45,000. The Hacklers filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and the trustee sought to avoid the transfer to Arianna as a preferential transfer under section 547(b). The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion and the district court affirmed (blogged here). Arianna appealed to the Third Circuit. [Read more…] about Property Purchased in Tax Sale for Less than Its Value Is Preferential Transfer

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State Court May Order Criminal Restitution Relating to Discharged Debt

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that its criminal law permits an order of restitution even though it relates to a debt that was discharged in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Commonwealth v. Petrick, No. 47 MAP 2018 (Pa. Sept. 26, 2019).

The issue came before the Court from the state superior court where the Appellant argued that his sentence for restitution was illegal because the underlying debt had been discharged in bankruptcy. The Court “granted allocatur . . . to address the effect a discharge of a civil debt by a federal bankruptcy court has on the authority of a state trial court to order mandatory restitution as part of a sentence in a criminal case involving the same obligation.” [Read more…] about State Court May Order Criminal Restitution Relating to Discharged Debt

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Bank Cannot Be Liable for RESPA Violation under Vicarious Liability Theory

In a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit held that a RESPA action under section 2605 against a servicer for failure to comply with its obligation to provide loss-mitigation options to the homeowner, could not extend to the mortgagee Bank under a theory of respondeat superior. Christiana Trust v. Riddle, 911 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018).

Here, the homeowner, Mary Sue Riddle, took out a loan with Bank of America and the Bank engaged Ocwen Loan Servicing to service the loan. After the current loan owner, Christiana Trust, initiated foreclosure proceedings against Ms. Riddle, she counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against the Bank and Ocwen, alleging that the servicer failed to comply with RESPA’s mandate that it respond to Ms. Riddle’s timely application for loss-mitigation options. Specifically, Ms. Riddle invoked 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E), which provides that “a servicer of a federally related mortgage shall not … fail to comply with any other obligation found by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, by regulation, to be appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.” The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss on the dual basis that Ms. Riddle failed to support her claim that the Bank was vicariously liable for Ocwen’s actions, and, in the alternative, because, under section 2605(k)(1)(E), the Bank could not be held liable for the actions of its servicer even if an agency relationship were established. [Read more…] about Bank Cannot Be Liable for RESPA Violation under Vicarious Liability Theory

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Scotus Offered Another Opportunity to Address Passive Conduct and the Automatic Stay

After recently declining cert in a case involving the issue of whether a creditor’s passive conduct can ever violate the automatic stay (Davis v. Tyson Prepared Foods, No. 18-941 (10th Cir. cert. denied, May 20, 2019) (blogged here)), the Supreme Court has been presented with another opportunity to take on the issue. In In re Fulton, Nos. 18-2527, 18-2793, 18-2835, 18-3023, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 18393 (7th Cir. June 19, 2019), (blogged here), the City of Chicago impounded the debtors’ vehicles prior to their filing for chapter 13 bankruptcy. Upon filing for bankruptcy, the debtors sought to have the vehicles returned. The City refused, and the bankruptcy court found its refusal constituted a violation of the automatic stay. The City appealed.

Citing its decision in Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that passively retaining, and refusing to return, estate property is an exercise of control within the meaning of section 362(a)(3). The court found that section 542(a) also mandates that an entity in possession of estate property turn it over to the trustee. The court rejected the City’s call to overturn Thompson, recognizing that one of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy is to allow a debtor to improve her financial situation, and that a vehicle is frequently necessary to achieve that goal.

The City’s petition for certiorari, points out that five courts of appeals (the second, seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh), have likewise found that passive conduct can be the basis for an automatic stay violation, while two courts of appeals (the tenth and the District of Columbia) have adopted the position that a creditor’s conduct must be affirmative.

City of Chicago v. Fulton Cert Petition