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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re

Phillip Leslie Frazier and
Jennifer Jo Frazier

No. 2:11-cv-00290-MCE

Debtors/Appellees,

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Real Time Resolutions, Inc.,

Creditor/Appellant.

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Real Time Resolutions, Inc. ("Appellant"), appeals from the Bankruptcy Court's order approving the removal of Appellant's junior lien on debtors Phillip and Leslie Frazier's ("Appellees") primary residence and confirming Appellees' Chapter 13 plan.

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1 The main issue presented by this appeal is one that has been
2 addressed by multiple bankruptcy courts since the collapse of the
3 housing market: whether a Chapter 13 debtor can “strip-off” a
4 wholly unsecured secondary or junior lien on the debtor’s
5 principal residence when the debtor is ineligible for discharge
6 because of a prior Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
7 § 1328(f) (1).

8 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision joins the growing split of
9 authority among bankruptcy courts across the country on this same
10 issue. For the reasons set forth below, the Bankruptcy Court’s
11 decision is affirmed.¹

12
13 **BACKGROUND**
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15 On August 3, 2009, Appellees filed a voluntary Chapter 13
16 bankruptcy petition. On August 17, 2009, Appellees’ Chapter 13
17 petition was converted into a Chapter 7 case. At that time,
18 Appellees were not eligible to proceed under Chapter 13 because
19 their scheduled, unsecured debts exceeded the debt limits imposed
20 by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Appellees indicated that there were two
21 outstanding mortgage liens secured by their primary residence,
22 located at 5610 Illinois Avenue, Fair Oaks, California, 95628
23 (“subject property”).

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¹ Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,
28 the Court deemed this matter suitable for decision without oral
argument. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

1 Appellees received a Chapter 7 discharge on December 21,
2 2009, which relieved them of in personam liability for those
3 mortgage liens securing the subject property; however, the in rem
4 liability on the subject property remained intact. Accordingly,
5 the senior and junior lien holders' state law lien rights in the
6 subject property "rode through" the Chapter 7 discharge and the
7 mortgage liens became non-recourse debts.

8 On December 30, 2009, Appellees filed a Chapter 13 petition
9 to address the outstanding liens secured by the subject property,
10 arrears, priority tax debt and other unsecured claims. (Excerpt
11 of Record ("ER"), ECF No. 19 at 9.) Courts colloquially refer to
12 this type of situation as a "Chapter 20" case.²

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25 ² The Supreme Court has expressly held that the Bankruptcy
26 Code allows debtors to file Chapter 20 cases. Johnson v. Home
27 State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (holding a debtor
28 could file a Chapter 13 after a Chapter 7 because the Bankruptcy
Code did not prohibit it and Congress specifically prohibited
other types of consecutive filings, therefore its choice not to
prohibit it meant that this type of filing was allowed).

1 In Chapter 20 cases, the debtors file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
2 receive a Chapter 7 discharge, and then file for Chapter 13
3 bankruptcy.³ Appellees admitted that one of the reasons they
4 filed the second Chapter 13 petition was to stay a foreclosure
5 action commenced by senior lien holder, Bank of America ("BOA"),
6 against the subject property. (Id. at 110-11.)

7 Schedule D of Appellees' Chapter 13 plan lists BOA as the
8 senior lien holder of the First Deed of Trust for the amount of
9 \$275,681.00, secured by the subject property. (Id. at 33.)

10 Schedule D also lists BOA as the junior lien holder of the Second
11 Deed of Trust for \$47,400.00, again secured by the subject
12 property. (Id.)

13 On January 6, 2010, Appellant filed a proof of claim for
14 \$53,591.82, representing the principal, interest, and late fees
15 owed on the Second Deed of Trust ("junior lien") on the subject
16 property. (Id. at 61-63.) Appellant identified itself as the
17 loan servicer for BOA's junior lien on the subject property.
18 (Id.)

19
20 ³ The Bankruptcy Court in this case aptly described the
strategy behind "Chapter 20" filings:

21 "[p]rior to the enactment of . . . [the Bankruptcy
22 Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act]. . . a
23 Chapter 20 was a useful tool for a debtor who exceeded
24 the monetary limits for a Chapter 13 case. See
25 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). By filing the Chapter 7 case to
26 discharge unsecured indebtedness, debtors could reduce
27 their debts to be within the monetary limits for the
filing a subsequent Chapter 13 case. Then, through the
subsequent Chapter 13 plan, debtors could save their
residence from foreclosure by curing any arrearage
through the plan or establish a court enforced
repayment plan for nondischargeable debt, such as tax
obligations."

28 In re Frazier, 448 B.R. 803, 807 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2011)

1 The Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay BOA, the senior lien
2 holder, as a class-one creditor holding a "secured claim"
3 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). (Id. at 115.) Appellees'
4 plan proposed to treat Appellant as a class-two creditor holding
5 an "unsecured claim" and to avoid Appellant's junior lien on the
6 subject property on the theory that there was not equity to which
7 its lien could attach. (Id. at 56.)

8 In order to remove Appellant's junior lien, Appellees filed
9 a Motion to Value Appellant's claim against the value of the
10 subject property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Section
11 506(a)(1) classifies a creditor's allowed claim as a "secured
12 allowed claim" or "unsecured allowed claim." See 11 U.S.C.
13 § 506(a)(1). After a claim is classified by 506(a)(1), a debtor
14 can propose to modify the rights of certain holders of unsecured
15 allowed claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).

16 In their Motion to Value, Appellees listed the value of the
17 subject property as \$240,000.00.⁴ (Id. at 60.) Appellant
18 objected to Appellees' Motion to Value and to the confirmation of
19 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan, arguing that Appellees could not
20 strip Appellant's junior lien because they were not eligible to
21 receive a Chapter 13 discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1).⁵
22 (Id. at 64-68.)

23
24 ⁴ No parties opposed Appellees' valuation of the subject
property.

25 ⁵ Section 1328(f)(1) provides, in pertinent part, "the court
26 shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for in the plan
27 or disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received a
28 discharge . . . (1) in a case filed under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of
this title during the 4-year period preceding the date of the
order for relief under this Chapter. . . ." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(f)(1).

1 Section 1328(f)(1) renders debtors who have received a Chapter 7
2 bankruptcy in the past four years ineligible to receive a Chapter
3 13 discharge. Both Appellant and Appellees filed extensive
4 briefing with the Bankruptcy Court concerning Appellant's
5 objections. (See id. at 88-129.)

6 The Bankruptcy Court overruled Appellant's objections and
7 confirmed Appellees' Chapter 13 Plan. (Id. at 174, 194.)

8 The Bankruptcy Court found that BOA's senior lien securing an
9 obligation of \$275,681.00 exhausted all of the value in the
10 subject property. (Id. at 190.) Accordingly, the Bankruptcy
11 Court determined that Appellant's junior lien was a wholly
12 unsecured allowed claim under § 506(a)(1), and the value of its
13 unsecured claims as \$53,591.82. (Id.)

14 The Bankruptcy Court also rejected Appellant's contention
15 that the amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) mandates discharge
16 to effectuate a lien strip, or instead, mandates payment of both
17 the secured and unsecured portions of its claim. (Id. at
18 188-89.) Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Nobelman v.
19 American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 124
20 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1993) and Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re
21 Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002), the Bankruptcy Court held
22 that a creditor attempting to assert rights under 11 U.S.C.
23 § 1325(a)(5) must be a holder of an allowed secured claim under
24 § 506(a)(1). (ER at 189.) Since Appellant did not hold a
25 secured claim under § 506(a)(1), it did not have a basis for
26 asserting rights under § 1325(a)(5). (Id.)

27 The Bankruptcy Court rejected Appellant's argument that a
28 lien may only be stripped upon discharge. (Id. at 187.)

1 In an effort to explain how the case would end in light of the
2 lack of discharge in Appellees' Chapter 20 case, the Bankruptcy
3 Court likened Appellees' Chapter 13 plan to a contract between
4 Appellees and the creditors. (Id. at 187.) Specifically, the
5 Bankruptcy Court stated, "[i]t is the Chapter 13 plan, by which
6 the debtor commits him or herself to a plan, which becomes the
7 new contract between debtors and creditors." (Id. [citing In re
8 Than, 215 B.R. 430 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1997)]). The Bankruptcy
9 Court explained that the debtor must pay the full amount of the
10 § 506(a) secured claim held by BOA through the Chapter 13 plan,
11 resulting in there being no outstanding obligation secured by the
12 lien. (Id.) Then, upon completion of the plan, the debtor
13 demands reconveyance of the deed of trust or release of the lien
14," from BOA as senior lien holder and Appellant, as junior
15 lien holder. (Id.) As to the close of the case, the Bankruptcy
16 Court noted, "[i]t is completion of the plan and performance
17 under the new contract created under the Bankruptcy Code which
18 results in the debtors having the right to demand and receive the
19 release of the lien. The granting or denying of discharge does
20 not alter or remove the lien, and it not . . . [a] basis for the
21 court to denying [sic] a motion to value a creditor's secured
22 claim." (Id.)

23 Finally, the Bankruptcy Court, on several grounds, overruled
24 Appellant's objection that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan was not
25 filed in good faith. First, the Bankruptcy Court overruled
26 Appellant's objections based on § 1325(a)(5), as discussed above.

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1 (Id. at 190.) Second, the court overruled Appellant's objection
2 to Appellees' projected monthly personal and business expenses
3 outlined in the Chapter 13 plan. (Id. at 191.) Third, the
4 Bankruptcy Court overruled Appellant's objections that because
5 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan was filed on the heels of their
6 previous Chapter 7 discharge, Appellees' Chapter 13 was filed in
7 bad faith. (Id. at 194.) To this end, the Bankruptcy Court
8 addressed the purpose of Appellees' Chapter 13 plan and conducted
9 a good faith analysis of the Chapter 13 plan. (Id. at 192-93.)
10 In conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court found that Appellees' Chapter
11 13 plan had been proposed in good faith and was not forbidden by
12 any law. (Id. at 194.) Importantly, the Bankruptcy Court also
13 found that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan complies "with the
14 provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1322 for the contents of the plan and
15 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) and (b) for confirmation of the plan proposed
16 in this case." Id.

17 On January 25, 2011, Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal
18 with the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit.
19 (Id. at 196-197.) On January 31, 2011, Appellees transferred the
20 appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158. (Id. at 198.)
21

22 **STANDARD**
23

24 An appellant may petition the district court for review of a
25 bankruptcy court's decision. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. The
26 applicable standard of review is identical to that employed by
27 circuit courts of appeal in reviewing district court decisions.

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1 See Heritage Ford v. Baroff (In re Baroff), 105 F.3d 439, 441
2 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, legal conclusions are renewed on a
3 de novo basis, and factual determinations are assessed pursuant
4 to a "clearly erroneous" standard. Murray v. Bammer (In re
5 Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

6 Findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" only if the
7 reviewing fact is "left with the definite and firm conviction
8 that a mistake has been committed." In re Marquam Inv. Corp.,
9 942 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
10 United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Appellant
11 has the burden of proving such error has been committed, and the
12 reviewing court should not reverse simply because another
13 decision could have been reached. In re Windsor Indus., Inc.,
14 459 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Tex. 1978).

15
16 **ANALYSIS**
17

18 Real Time's appeal rests on two arguments: 1) the Bankruptcy
19 Court erred in determining that Appellees could remove
20 Appellant's lien without obtaining a Chapter 13 discharge, and
21 (2) the Bankruptcy Court erred in entering an order confirming
22 Appellees' Chapter 13 Plan when Appellant's claim was not treated
23 in the proposed Chapter 13 Plan. (Appellant's Opening Brief, ECF
24 No. 17 at 8-9.)

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1 **A. Removal of Lien Without a Chapter 13 Discharge**

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3 The central issue on appeal presents a question of law
4 addressed by conflicting court decisions concerning the interplay
5 between various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code affecting
6 "Chapter 20" bankruptcy cases, including provisions modified by
7 the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
8 2005 ("BAPCPA").

9 Put simply, the issue presented by cases of this nature is
10 whether a Chapter 20 debtor may strip a wholly unsecured,
11 inferior mortgage lien off the debtor's primary residence in a
12 Chapter 13 case filed less than four years after having received
13 a Chapter 7 discharge. More specifically, the issue is whether a
14 debtor, who has been discharged of in personam liability for a
15 home mortgage debt by receiving a Chapter 7 discharge, may then
16 modify the in rem rights of the holder of the mortgage debt by
17 removing the lien through a Chapter 13 plan even though the
18 debtors are ineligible for discharge, and if so, under what
19 circumstances.

20 Accordingly, there is a growing split of authority among
21 courts across the country regarding the permissibility and
22 permanence of Chapter 20 lien stripping. This issue is a
23 divisive one in many jurisdictions, including California.

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1 Compare In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010) and
2 In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010) (both finding
3 that Chapter 20 lien stripping is permissible and permanent upon
4 plan completion and a finding of good faith) with In re Victorio,
5 454 B.R. 759, 2011 WL 2746054 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) and
6 In re Winitzky, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2430 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 7,
7 2009) (both finding that Chapter 20 lien stripping is
8 impermissible in absence of discharge). The split of authority
9 can be grouped into three approaches. See In re Jennings,
10 454 B.R. 252, 256-57 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (explaining the three
11 approaches).

12 Courts adopting the first approach "allow Chapter 20 lien
13 stripping because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prevents it."⁶
14 Id. These courts contend that the mechanism that voids the lien
15 is plan completion, and that Chapter 20 cases end in
16 administrative closing—not discharge. Id.

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23 ⁶ See In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176; In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230
24 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010); In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90 (Bankr. D.
25 Nev. 2011); In re Fisette, 455 B.R. 177 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011);
26 In re Scotto-Diclemente, 2011 WL 5835653 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 18,
27 2011); In re Miller, 2011 WL 6257450 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
28 2011); In re Gloster, 459 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2011); In re
Sadowski, 2011 WL 4572005 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011); In re
Jennings, 454 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011); In re Fair,
450 B.R. 853 (E.D. Wis. 2011); In re Waterman, 447 B.R. 324
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2011); In re Davis, 2011 WL 1237638
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 30, 2011).

1 Courts that adopt the second approach allow Chapter 20 lien
2 stripping; however, after plan consummation, without a discharge,
3 the parties' pre-bankruptcy rights are reinstated.⁷ Id. These
4 courts assert that a Chapter 13 discharge is required to void the
5 lien, and that Chapter 20 plans end in dismissal because they are
6 ineligible for discharge. Id.

7 Courts utilizing the third approach "hold that Chapter 20
8 lien stripping is impermissible because it amounts to a de facto
9 discharge," which is prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1).⁸ Id.
10 These courts rely on an interpretation of the Supreme Court case
11 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S. Ct. 773, 116 L. Ed. 2d 903
12 (1992), and Congress' inclusion of a discharge requirement in
13 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

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16 ⁷ See In re Casey, 428 B.R. 519 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010);
17 In re Trujillo, 2010 WL 4669095 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2010);
18 In re Colbourne, 2010 WL 4485508 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2010);
19 Hart v. San Diego Credit Union, 449 B.R. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
2010); In re Jazo, 2010 WL 3947303 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010);
In re Davis, 447 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011).

20 ⁸ See In re Victorio, 454 B.R. 759, 2011 WL 2746054 (Bankr.
21 S.D. Cal. July 8, 2011); In re Winitzky, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2430
22 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 7, 2009); In re Geradin, 447 B.R. 342
23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that Chapter 20 debtor could not
24 avoid lien because of ineligibility for discharge); In re Fenn,
25 428 B.R. 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that by virtue of
26 Section 1325(a)(5) holder of secured claim retains the lien until
27 the underlying debt is paid in full or discharged); In re
28 Orkwis, 457 B.R. 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (finding discharge a necessary
prerequisite to permanency of lien avoidance); In re Lilly,
378 B.R. 232, 236-37 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that by
virtue of Section 1325(a)(5) holder of secured claim retains the
lien until the underlying debt is paid in full); In re Lindskog,
451 B.R. 863 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011); In re Erdmann, 446 B.R. 861
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); In re Mendoza, 2010 WL 736834
(Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010); In re Blosser, 2009 WL 1064455
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Apr. 15, 2009).

1 For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with those
2 courts adopting the first approach, which hold that a wholly
3 unsecured junior lien on the debtor's principal residence may be
4 removed in Chapter 20 action despite the operation of
5 § 1328(f)(1). Therefore, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy
6 Court's decision.

7 The determination of whether Appellees' Chapter 13 plan may
8 remove Appellant's junior lien necessitates analysis of the
9 interplay between §§ 506(a)(1), 1322(b)(2) and 1328(f)(1) of the
10 Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the Court's analysis begins with a
11 discussion of those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

12
13 **1. Secured and Unsecured Claims Under 11 U.S.C. §**
14 **506(a)(1)**

15 Whether Appellees' Chapter 13 plan may remove Appellant's
16 lien dependent on its § 506(a)(1) classification. Section
17 506(a)(1) classifies the holder of an allowed claim as a holder
18 of an "allowed secured claim" or an "allowed unsecured claim."
19 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (emphasis added). Classification as the
20 latter renders stripping of the lien impermissible. The
21 506(a)(1) classification is based on the value of the underlying
22 collateral:

23 "An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
24 property . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the
25 value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
26 interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed
claim."

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1 Id. Section 506(a) also bifurcates an *undersecured* creditor's
2 claim into two parts: a secured claim to the extent of the value
3 of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the balance of the
4 claim. In re Fair, 450 B.R. 853, 855 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (emphasis
5 added).

6 Holding an allowed secured claim under the Bankruptcy Code
7 is not necessarily synonymous with holding a security interest
8 outside of bankruptcy. See In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1223.

9 "Secured claim" is a term of art within the Bankruptcy Code and
10 means something different than it does for a creditor to have a
11 security interest or lien outside of bankruptcy. Id.; In re
12 Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90, 93 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011). Outside of
13 bankruptcy, if a creditor has a valid security interest,
14 regardless of the collateral's value, it may be thought of as a
15 secured creditor. Id. Conversely, in bankruptcy, a creditor is
16 only a secured creditor if its claim is classified under
17 § 506(a)(1). Id. If the claim is not a "allowed secured claim,"
18 the once-secured creditor will have an unsecured claim for
19 purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. This leads to the
20 counterintuitive possibility that in bankruptcy, a creditor
21 holding a wholly unsecured allowed claim is classified as a
22 holder of an "allowed unsecured claim" in the Chapter 13 plan,
23 but also has "rights" of a secured creditor outside of
24 bankruptcy. Id.

25 In this case, BOA's senior lien for \$275,681.00 exhausted
26 all the \$240,000.00 of value in the subject property.

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1 Thus, there is zero value in the subject property for Appellant's
2 junior lien to attach, rendering Appellant's claim a wholly
3 unsecured allowed claim pursuant to § 506(a)(1).
4

5 **2. Lien Stripping and Chapter 13**
6

7 The status of Appellant's unsecured allowed claim dictates
8 whether or not Appellees' Chapter 13 plan can remove Appellant's
9 junior lien. Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code allows
10 Chapter 13 debtors to modify the rights of creditors holding both
11 secured and unsecured claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (directing
12 that a Chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of
13 secured claims . . . or of holders of unsecured claims).
14 Thus, in limited scenarios, § 1322 can be used to effectuate a
15 lien strip of both unsecured and secured claims in a Chapter 13
16 plan. Id.

17 Congress has placed certain restrictions on the ability of
18 consumer debtors to impact the rights of holders of mortgage
19 liens under § 1322(b)(2), which prohibits a Chapter 13 debtor
20 from modifying the rights of a holder of a secured mortgage debt
21 if the mortgage debt is secured by a lien against the debtor's
22 principle residence. See In re Miller, 462 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr.
23 E.D.N.Y. 2011). This prohibition has come to be known as the
24 "antimodification provision," and has given rise to substantial
25 litigation over the extent to which § 1322(b)(2) applies. Id.

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1 In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, the Supreme Court
2 addressed the issue of “whether § 1322(b) (2) prohibits a
3 [C]hapter 13 debtor from relying on § 506(a) to reduce an
4 undersecured homestead mortgage to fair market value of the
5 mortgage residence.” 508 U.S. at 325-26 (emphasis added).
6 There, the debtors—the Nobelmans—executed an adjustable rate
7 note for \$68,250.00 to purchase their primary residence. Id. at
8 326. The note was secured by a deed of trust. Id. The
9 Nobelmans filed Chapter 13 after falling behind on mortgage
10 payments. Id. The bank holding the deed of trust filed a proof
11 of claim for \$71,335.00 in principal, interest, and fees owed on
12 the note. Id. The Nobelmans’ Chapter 13 plan valued their
13 primary residence at a mere \$23,500 and proposed to bifurcate the
14 bank’s claim into two parts, pursuant to § 506(a) (1): a secured
15 claim for \$23,500.00 and an unsecured claim for the remaining
16 amount on the note. Id. In other words, the debtors proposed to
17 “strip-down” the bank’s undersecured claim to the fair market
18 value of the home—\$23,500. Id. Accordingly, the Nobelmans
19 proposed to only pay the bank \$23,500 and remove the residual,
20 unsecured portion of the lien. Id.

21 After reviewing the statutory language and applicable case
22 law, the Court held that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot strip-down a
23 partially unsecured residential mortgage lien secured by the
24 debtor’s principal residence. Id. at 332. The Supreme Court
25 confirmed that the appropriate starting point to determine
26 whether a lien strip-down or strip-off is appropriate is through
27 application of § 506(a) (1).

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1 Id. at 328 (finding specifically that “[p]etitioners were correct
2 in looking to § 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the collateral
3 to determine the status of the bank’s secured claim.”) (internal
4 citations omitted). The Supreme Court read the language “a claim
5 secured only by a security interest in real property” to refer
6 “to the lienholder’s entire claim, including both the secured and
7 unsecured components of the claim.” Id. at 331 (interpreting
8 § 1322(b) (2) to prohibit a residential mortgage lien from being
9 stripped down to the value of the collateral). The Court held
10 that as long as there is some value in the collateral to which
11 the lien could attach, the entire lien was protected under
12 § 1322(b) (2).

13 In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
14 addressed a corollary question not at issue in Nobelman: whether
15 the holder of a mortgage against a Chapter 13 debtor’s residence
16 which is wholly unsecured is entitled to the protections of the
17 antimodification provisions of § 1322(b) (2), or whether the
18 rights of such a mortgage holder can be modified by treating the
19 claim as an unsecured claim in the debtor’s plan. In re Lam,
20 211 B.R. 36, 40 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). In Lam, the undisputed
21 value of the Chapter 13 debtors’ primary residence was
22 \$300,000.00. Id. at 38. The residence was encumbered by four
23 mortgage liens totaling \$803,239.00. Id. The debtors’ Chapter
24 13 plan proposed to strip-off the fourth deed of trust for
25 \$17,193.00 on the theory that the lien was a wholly underwater,
26 unsecured claim under § 506(a) (1). Id.

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1 The Lam panel held the antimodification provision protecting a
2 loan secured by an interest in a debtor's principal residence, as
3 set out in § 1322(b)(2), does not apply if there is no value to
4 which the security interest could attach because the principal
5 residence was already fully subsumed by the security interest of
6 the senior lien holder. Id. at 40. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit
7 followed Lam in In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220. The Zimmer court
8 held that the antimodification protection of §1322(b)(2) only
9 operates to benefit creditors who may be classified as allowed
10 secured claim holders after operation of § 506(a)(1). Id. at
11 1226.

12 Thus, In re Lam and In re Zimmer instruct that the
13 antimodification provision does not protect a creditor whose
14 junior lien on a debtor's primary residence has been classified
15 as an "unsecured claim" by § 506(a)(1). This logic is "compelled
16 by the Supreme Court's decision in Nobelman," and has been
17 embraced by all six circuit courts that have considered the
18 question. See In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. at 94 (citing In re
19 Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1227).⁹

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24 ⁹ See In re Lane, 280 F.3d 663, 667-69 (6th Cir. 2002);
25 Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 126
26 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (11th Cir.
27 2000); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 288, 295 (5th Cir. 2000);
28 In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 611 (3d Cir. 2000). Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels have also reached this same result. See
In re Griffey, 335 B.R. 166, 167-68 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2005); See
In re Mann, 249 B.R. 831, 836 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000)).

1 Other courts addressing whether lien stripping is allowed in
2 a Chapter 13 case also have considered 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) as a
3 lien stripping mechanism; however, reliance on § 506(d) is
4 misplaced. Section 506(d) provides that “[t]o the extent that a
5 lien secured a claim against a debtor that is not an allowed
6 secured claim, such a lien is void.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). “In
7 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992), the Supreme Court held
8 that Section 506(d) only avoids a lien to the extent that the
9 underlying claim was disallowed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502.”
10 In re Fair, 450 B.R. at 856. Thus, Dewsnup prohibited lien
11 stripping of Chapter 7 allowed claims. In light of Dewsnup,
12 Section 506(d) is not the proper tool for lien stripping of
13 allowed claims in Chapter 13. Id. (citing In re Hill, 440 B.R.
14 at 181; In re Fenn, 428 B.R. at 500; In re Geradin, 447 B.R. at
15 346)). Regardless of 506(d)’s inapplicability, lien stripping is
16 expressly and broadly permitted in the context of rehabilitative
17 bankruptcy proceedings under Chapters 11, 12 and 13. Id. (citing
18 In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 291 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000)).

19 Accordingly, § 1322(b)(2) authorizes the removal of
20 Appellant’s wholly unsecured junior lien on the subject property
21 in Appellees’ Chapter 13 plan. Appellant’s claim was classified
22 as an unsecured allowed claim after operation of § 506(a)(1),
23 thus, it does not qualify for the antimodification protection of
24 § 1322(b)(2).

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1 **3. 2005 BAPCPA Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code**

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3 The prior discussion brings us to § 1328(f)(1), the crucial
4 issue presented by this appeal.¹⁰ Appellants argue the
5 Bankruptcy Court erred in confirming Appellees' Chapter 13 plan's
6 removal of Appellant's junior lien because Appellees received a
7 prior Chapter 7 discharge, and thus, they are ineligible to
8 receive a Chapter 13 discharge. (See generally Appellant's
9 Opening Brief, ECF No. 17 at 12, 14-15, 18-22.) As such,
10 Appellants contend Appellees' Chapter 13 plan cannot remove their
11 junior lien from the subject property because in the context of a
12 Chapter 13 plan, discharge is required to effectuate a lien
13 strip.

14 The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code affected changes
15 to § 1328(f)(1) that has now caused courts to question whether
16 the removal of an valueless junior lien in a Chapter 20 case
17 remains possible. See In re Gloster, 2011 WL 5114833, at *9-10
18 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2011). As previously noted, § 1328(f)(1)
19 prohibits a Chapter 13 discharge if the debtor received a
20 discharge in a Chapter 7, 11 or 12 cases in the four years
21 preceding the date of the order for relief in the Chapter 13
22 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1).

23
24 ¹⁰ During the bankruptcy proceedings, Appellants argued that
25 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan could not remove Appellant's junior
26 lien because under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5), discharge is required
27 to effectuate a lien-strip. Appellant has not raised this
28 argument on appeal. In any event, the Court agrees with the
Bankruptcy Court's decision finding § 1325(a)(5) is inapplicable
to Appellant's allowed unsecured claim. Section 1325(a)(5) has
no applicability to unsecured allowed claims, which are
separately governed by the confirmation requirements of
§ 1325(a)(4).

1 This change allows debtors the benefit of a Chapter 13 automatic
2 stay and a chance to work out a repayment plan with creditors but
3 denies them the benefit of a Chapter 13 discharge.

4 Still, even with the inclusion of 11 U.S.C. §1328(f)(1) with
5 the BAPCPA, Congress was deliberate in only prohibiting discharge
6 in a Chapter 20 case. The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically
7 prohibit stripping off unsecured mortgage liens for a debtor who
8 is ineligible to receive a discharge, even though such language
9 could easily have been added. See In re Gloster, 2011 WL
10 5114833, at *4 ("Given the wide-ranging changes effected by
11 BAPCPA, and its emphasis on ensuring that abusive use of
12 bankruptcy protections not be permitted, it is significant that
13 no changes were made to the Bankruptcy Code to disallow the
14 strip-off of liens in Chapter 20 cases."). As noted by the court
15 in In re Jennings, "nothing in sections 506, 1322, 1325, 1327, or
16 any other section of the Bankruptcy Code limits a Chapter 20
17 debtor's ability to take advantage of the protections Chapter 13
18 provides. Lien-stripping is one of the tools in the Chapter 13
19 toolbox. And use of the Chapter 13 lien stripping tool is not
20 conditioned on discharge eligibility." 454 B.R. at 258 (citing
21 In re Hill, 440 B.R. at 182; In re Tran, 431 B.R. at 235).

22 Further, the court in In re Hill argued that "to judicially
23 impose a discharge requirement on the debtor's ability to strip a
24 lien when none is required by statute cannot be reconciled with
25 the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Home State Bank,
26 501 U.S. 78, 87." 440 B.R. at 181-82.

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1 Specifically, “[i]n Johnson, the Court held ‘Congress did not
2 intend to categorically foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 lien
3 reorganization to a debtor who previously filed for Chapter 7
4 relief.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). “By its plain
5 terms, § 1328(f) does not require another discharge when a later
6 case is filed; it simply denies an untimely discharge in a later
7 case.” Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
8 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989); In re Silverman, 616 F.3d 1001, 1006
9 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that statutory plain language must be
10 respected)).

11 Put more simply, “denying certain [C]hapter 13 debtors the
12 right to a discharge did nothing to change the fact that lien
13 stripping is generally allowed under Chapter 13.” In re Fair,
14 450 B.R. at 857. In many Chapter 13 cases, “it is the ability to
15 reorganize one’s financial life and pay off debts, not the
16 ability to receive a discharge, that is the debtor’s holy grail.”
17 Id. (citing In re Bateman, 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)).
18 Accordingly, Congress did not intend to prevent lien stripping
19 through 1328(f)(1) and no discharge is required to effectuate a
20 strip of a junior lien of a debtor’s primary residence.

21 Applied here, § 1328(f)(1) does not affect Appellees’
22 ability to strip Appellant’s wholly junior lien in their Chapter
23 13 plan because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prevents Chapter
24 20 debtors from stripping junior liens off their primary
25 residence pursuant to §§ 506(a)(1) and 1322(b)(2). Section
26 1328(f)(1) only prohibits discharge, not lien stripping.

27 ///

28 ///

1 Instead of discharge, the Court agrees with the underlying
2 Bankruptcy Court and finds plan completion is the appropriate end
3 to Appellees' Chapter 20 case. The lien strip will become
4 permanent not upon a discharge, as would happen in a typical
5 Chapter 13 case, but upon completion of all payments as required
6 by the plan. See In re Blenheim, 2011 WL 6779709 (Bankr. W.D.
7 Wash. Dec. 27, 2011). The reasoning set forth in In re Tran,
8 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010), is persuasive:

9 [T]he Bankruptcy Code does not condition a chapter 13
10 debtor's right to strip off a wholly unsecured junior
11 lien on the debtor's eligibility for a discharge.
12 Rather, such right is conditioned on the debtor's
obtaining confirmation of, and performing under, a
chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory
requirements.

13 431 B.R. at 235; accord In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176, 182 (Bankr.
14 S.D. Cal. 2010) (“[L]ien strips are permitted in Chapter 20 cases
15 even without a discharge.”); In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. at 100
16 (“[C]hapter 20 bankruptcy is permissible under the Code, and
17 [debtors] may take advantage of all available chapter 13
18 restructuring tools,” including lien stripping.); In re Fisette,
19 455 B.R. 177, 185 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2011) (“We hold that the strip
20 off of a wholly unsecured lien on a debtor's principal residence
21 ... is not contingent on his receipt of a Chapter 13 discharge”).
22 Further, as noted by the court in In Re Okosisi,

23 “[a]t the successful completion of all payments in a
24 no-discharge chapter 13 case, no order discharging the
25 debtor will be entered because the debtor is not
26 eligible for a discharge. . . [I]n this situation, the
27 proper result is for the court to close the case
28 without discharge. . . . Because the no-discharge case
is closed without discharge, rather than dismissed, the
code sections that reverse any lien avoidance actions
contained within a chapter 13 plan upon conversion or
dismissal are not implicated, and, thus, do not act to
prevent the permanence of the lien avoidance

1 Once a debtor successfully complete all plan payments
2 required by a chapter 13 plan, the provisions of the
3 plan become permanent, and the lien avoidance is,
4 similarly permanent."

5 451 B.R. at 99-100 (noting that although, per In re Leavitt,
6 171 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999), a Chapter 13 case can only
7 end in one of three ways: conversion, dismissal, or discharge.
8 BAPCPA's addition of § 1328(f) "opened up the possibility of a
9 fourth option, the completion of all plan payments without a
10 discharge"); contra In re Victorio, 454 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr.
11 S.D. Cal. 2011) ("[D]ebtors in a Chapter 20 case cannot obtain a
12 'permanent' avoidance of a wholly unsecured junior lien on their
13 principal residence unless they pay the claim amount in full, or
14 obtain a discharge.").

15 Conversely, if a Chapter 13 case is dismissed or converted
16 to a Chapter 7 prior to the successful completion of all plan
17 payments, actions taken to avoid a lien are undone, and a junior
18 lien holder's in rem rights would remain intact.

19 Importantly, in order for a Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed
20 in this scenario, the plan must otherwise comply with all other
21 requirements for plan confirmation set forth in the Code. See
22 e.g. In re Tran, 431 B.R. at 235 (permitting Chapter 20 lien
23 stripping but requiring plan that otherwise "meets all of the
24 statutory requirements"); In re Hill, 440 B.R. at 182 (permitting
25 Chapter 20 lien stripping but requiring plan that "otherwise
26 complies with the requirements of the Code"). "Once the lien is
27 so avoided, the unsecured claim that is represented by this
28 nonrecourse debt becomes an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy."

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1 In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. at 96. As the holder of an unsecured
2 claim, the creditor whose lien was stripped "need only be paid
3 its pro-rata share of Debtors' disposable income calculated under
4 707(b) and its pro-rata share of any equity in Debtors' assets."
5 In re Hill, 440 B.R. at 183.

6 In Appellees' case, Appellant's lien will be permanently
7 stripped upon plan completion and the case will end in
8 administrative closing. Assuming Appellees complete their
9 Chapter 13 plan, Appellant will receive a pro-rata distribution
10 of Appellees' disposable income—which here, is zero—and a
11 pro rata distribution of any assets remaining after competition
12 of payments to creditors holding allowed secured claims and
13 priority unsecured creditors. In the event that Appellees do not
14 make all required Chapter 13 plan payments, Appellees' Chapter 13
15 plan would be converted to a Chapter 7 or dismissed. Appellant
16 would then have the option to exercise its remaining in rem
17 rights against the subject property recognized by state law.

18 Based on the foregoing, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy
19 Court's holding that Appellees could remove Appellant's lien
20 without obtaining a Chapter 13 discharge.

21
22 **B. Treatment of Appellant's Claim Under the Chapter 13**
23 **Plan**

24 Appellant's second argument on appeal is that the Bankruptcy
25 Court erred in confirming Appellees' Chapter 13 plan because
26 Appellant's claim was not "treated" in the proposed Chapter 13
27 plan. (Appellant's Opening Brief, ECF No. 17 at 21.)

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1 Appellant's argument is not the model of clarity. To paraphrase,
2 Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in confirming
3 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan because new consideration was not
4 provided as part of the contract which arises out of Appellees'
5 Chapter 13 plan.

6 Specifically, Appellant challenges the Bankruptcy Court's
7 confirmation of Appellees' Chapter 13 plan arguing that Appellees
8 did not provide "new consideration" to them as an unsecured
9 creditor. (Appellant's Opening Brief, ECF No. 17 at 21, 23.) The
10 Bankruptcy Court likened Appellees' Chapter 13 plan to a contract
11 between Appellees and creditors, thus, Appellant is now demanding
12 "new consideration" to support this "contract."

13 First, Appellant cites to no authority requiring new
14 consideration to be provided to an unsecured creditor in order
15 for a bankruptcy court to confirm a debtor's proposed Chapter 13
16 plan. Further, the Chapter 13 plan is authorized by the
17 Bankruptcy Code, which does not require the concept of "new
18 consideration" in order for a bankruptcy court to approve
19 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan. Thus, Appellant's reliance on a
20 California statute requiring consideration for a contract to be
21 valid is misplaced. The Bankruptcy Code governs the contents and
22 confirmation of Appellees' Chapter 13 plan, not California
23 statutory or common law governing contracts. Further, the
24 Bankruptcy Court found that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan was
25 proposed in good faith and that the contents of the Chapter 13
26 plan complied with § 1322.

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1 Appellant argues that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan should not
2 have been confirmed because it does not meet one the requirements
3 for plan confirmation—§ 1325(a)(4). Appellant argues that the
4 consideration required to support the contract can be found in
5 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) and that the court improperly found that
6 Appellees' plan complied with § 1325(a)(4).

7 Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code sets out requirements a
8 debtor must meet before the Bankruptcy Court can confirm a
9 debtor's Chapter 13 plan. At issue here is § 1325(a)(4), which
10 provides:

11 (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court
12 shall confirm a plan if ...

13 (4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
14 property to be distributed under the plan on account of
15 each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate
of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this
title on such date.

16 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). This provision, known as the "best
17 interest of creditors test," ensures that a Chapter 13 plan
18 provides unsecured creditors with at least as much return as they
19 would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The application of the
20 "best interests test" rests with the discretion of the Bankruptcy
21 Court. 8 Collier on Bankruptcy, (15th Ed. Revised), ¶ 1325.05,
22 at 1325-17 (internal citations omitted). As the determination of
23 whether a debtor's plan complies with § 1325(a)(4) is a factual
24 finding, the Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court's determination
25 under the clearly erroneous standard. See Murray, 131 F.3d at
26 792) (factual determinations are assessed pursuant to a "clearly
27 erroneous" standard).

28 ///

1 Appellant contends that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan fails
2 under the liquidation analysis provided by § 1325(a)(4), and
3 thus, does not provide "consideration" to support the new
4 contract proposed by Appellees' Chapter 13 plan. (Appellant's
5 Opening Brief, ECF No. 17 at 23-24.) Specifically, Appellant
6 contends that in the event of a Chapter 7 liquidation at this
7 juncture, Appellee would owe Appellant the full amount of
8 Appellant's outstanding claim of \$53,591.82. Accordingly,
9 Appellant contends Appellees' plan fails to meet § 1325(a)(4)
10 because the Chapter 13 plan anticipates a 0.00% payment to
11 unsecured creditors like Appellants. (Id.)

12 To the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court specifically found
13 that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan complied with the plan
14 confirmation requirements set forth in § 1325(a) and (b). (ER at
15 194 (emphasis added).) The Court agrees with the Bankruptcy
16 Court's finding that Appellees' Chapter 13 plan met the
17 § 1325(a)(4) requirement. Specifically, if Appellees filed for
18 Chapter 7 liquidation, BOA and Appellant would retain their
19 in rem rights against the subject property which would allow them
20 to foreclose on Appellant's property. BOA's senior lien for
21 \$275,681.00 would fully exhaust the value of the subject
22 property. Thus, in a hypothetical liquidation, the value of
23 Appellant's junior lien and in rem rights is \$0.00.
24 Accordingly, the Court finds the Bankruptcy Court's finding that
25 § 1325(a)(4) was not clearly erroneous.

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1 As to Appellant's claim that it is not treated at all in
2 Appellees' Chapter 13 plan, that argument is disingenuous.
3 Appellant holds an unsecured allowed claim and its claim is
4 subject to modification of its rights under § 1322(b)(2). As the
5 holder of an unsecured claim under § 1325(b)(4), Appellant need
6 only be paid its pro rata share of Appellees' disposable income
7 calculated under § 707(b), along with its pro rata share of any
8 equity in Appellees' assets. Since § 1322(a)(3) requires that
9 claims within the same class be treated in the same manner,
10 Appellant is "entitled to be paid whatever [is paid generally to
11 unsecured creditors], the prior chapter 7 discharge
12 notwithstanding." In re Gounder, 266 B.R. 879, 881 (Bankr. E.D.
13 Cal. 2001).

14 Thus, to the extent that Appellant argues that its claim is
15 not "treated" in Appellees' Chapter 13 plan, the Court finds its
16 position untenable. Appellees' Chapter 13 plan provides for
17 Appellant's claim and treats Appellant as a creditor holding an
18 allowed unsecured claim. Accordingly, the Court affirms the
19 Bankruptcy Court's decision to confirm Appellees' Chapter 13
20 Plan.

21
22 **CONCLUSION**

23
24 The Bankruptcy Court did not err in confirming Appellees'
25 Chapter 13 plan and approving the removal of Appellant's junior
26 lien, despite the fact Appellees were ineligible for discharge
27 pursuant to § 1328(f)(1).

28 ///

1 Section 1328(f)(1) only prohibits a Chapter 20 debtor from
2 obtaining a discharge, not from removing a wholly unsecured,
3 junior lien from a debtor's primary residence. Last, the
4 Bankruptcy Court did not err in confirming Appellees' Chapter 13
5 plan despite Appellant's treatment as an unsecured creditor. As
6 previously noted, Appellant was classified as holder of an
7 unsecured allowed claim pursuant to § 506(a)(1) and will receive
8 a pro rata distribution of Appellees' available disposable income
9 and in any remaining equity in Appellees' available assets at the
10 end of Appellees' plan. The Court also agrees with the
11 Bankruptcy Court that Appellees' Chapter 13 case with end upon
12 plan completion. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's decision is
13 affirmed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file.

14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 Dated: March 8, 2012

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18 MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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